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Abstract
Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity from trusted public certificates (e.g.,
national identity cards and/or ePassports; eSIM) is introduced here to
permissionless blockchains in order to remove the inefficiencies of Sybil-
resistant mechanisms such as Proof-of-Work (i.e., high energy and en-
vironmental costs) and Proof-of-Stake (i.e., capital hoarding and lower
transaction volume). The proposed solution effectively limits the number
of mining nodes a single individual would be able to run while keeping
membership open to everyone, circumventing the impossibility of full de-
centralization and the blockchain scalability trilemma when instantiated
on a blockchain with a consensus protocol based on the cryptographic
random selection of nodes. Resistance to collusion is also considered.
Solving one of the most pressing problems in blockchains, a zk-PoI
cryptocurrency is proved to have the following advantageous properties:
- an incentive-compatible protocol for the issuing of cryptocurrency
rewards based on a unique Nash equilibrium
- strict domination of mining over all other PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies,
thus the zk-PoI cryptocurrency becoming the preferred choice by miners
is proved to be a Nash equilibrium and the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
- PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies are condemned to pay the Price of Crypto-
Anarchy, redeemed by the optimal efficiency of zk-PoI as it implements
the social optimum
- the circulation of a zk-PoI cryptocurrency Pareto dominates other
PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies
- the network effects arising from the social networks inherent to na-
tional identity cards and ePassports dominate PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies
- the lower costs of its infrastructure imply the existence of a unique
equilibrium where it dominates other forms of payment
Keywords: zero-knowledge, remote attestation, anonymous creden-
tials, incentive compatibility, dominant strategy equilibria, Nash equilibria,
Price of Crypto-Anarchy, Pareto dominance, blockchain, cryptocurrencies
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1 Introduction
Sybil-resistance for permissionless consensus comes at a big price since it needs
to waste computation using Proof-of-Work (PoW), in addition to assuming
that a majority of the participants must be honest. In contrast, permissioned
consensus is able to overcome these issues assuming the existence of a Public-Key
Infrastructure[DS83, DLS88, CL99] otherwise it would be vulnerable to Sybil
attacks[Dou02]: indeed, it has been recently proved[PS18] that consensus without
authentication is impossible without using Proof-of-Work. Proof-of-Stake, the
alternative to PoW, is economically inefficient because participants must keep
capital at stake which incentivise coin hoarding and ultimately leads to lower
transaction volume.
Another major challenge in permissionless blockchains is scalability, both
in number of participants and total transaction volume. Blockchains based on
Proof-of-Work are impossible to scale because they impose a winner-take-all
contest between rent-seeking miners who waste enormous amounts of resources,
and their proposed replacements based on Proof-of-Stake don’t exhibit the high
decentralization desired for permissionless blockchains.
The solution proposed in this paper prevents Sybil attacks without resorting
to Proof-of-Work and/or Proof-of-Stake on permissionless blockchains while
additionally guaranteeing anonymous identity verification: towards this goal,
zero-knowledge proofs of trusted PKI certificates (i.e., national identity cards
and/or ePassports) are used to limit the number of mining nodes that a single
individual could run; alternatively, a more efficient solution based on mutual
attestation is proposed and demonstrated practical 4.2.5. Counterintuitively,
the blockchain would still be permissionless even though using government IDs
because the term “permissionless” literally means “without requiring permission”
(i.e., to access, to join, ...) and governments would not be authorizing access to
the blockchain; moreover, the goal is to be open to all countries of the world
4.3, thus its openness is indistinguishable from PoW/PoS blockchains (i.e., the
union of all possible national blockchains equals a permissionless, open and
global blockchain). Coincidently, the latest regulations [otCCAC18] point to the
obligation to verify and use real-world identities on blockchains, and the banning
of contaminant cryptocurrency mining[BG19, DC19].
Blockchain research has focused on better consensus algorithms obviating
that incentives are a central aspect of permissionless blockchains and that better
incentive mechanisms would improve the adoption of blockchains much more
that scalability improvements. To bridge this gap, new proofs are introduced to
demonstrate that mining a new cryptocurrency based on Zero-Knowledge Proof-
of-Identity would strictly dominate previous PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies, thus
replacing them is proved to be a Nash equilibrium; additionally, the circulation
of the proposed cryptocurrency would Pareto dominate other cryptocurrencies.
Furthermore, thanks to the network effects arising from the network of users of
trusted public certificates, the proposed cryptocurrency could become dominant
over previous cryptocurrencies and the lower costs of its infrastructure imply the
existence of a unique equilibrium where it dominates other forms of payment.
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1.1 Contributions
The main and novel contributions are:
• The use of anonymous credentials in permissionless blockchains in order to
prevent Sybil attacks 4: previous works[KITD17, DYSZ17] considered the
use of PKI infrastructures in blockchains (i.e., permissioned ledgers) but
without transforming them into anonymous credentials in order to obtain
the equivalent of a permissionless blockchain. Other works have consid-
ered anonymous credentials on blockchains[GGM13, SABBD18, CDD17,
FMMO18, Res18], but requiring the issuance of new credentials and not
reusing previously existing ones: verifying real-world identities and issuing
their corresponding digital certificates is the most expensive part of any
real-world deployment.
– The practical implementation and its perfomance evaluation 4.2.5 for
national identity cards and ePassports.
• Circumventing the impossibility of full decentralization 4.4 and the blockchain
scalability trilemma.
• A protocol for an incentive-compatible cryptocurrency 1: previous blockchains
mint cryptocurrencies tied to the process of reaching a consensus on the or-
der of the transactions, but the game-theoretic properties of this mechanism
is neither clear nor explicit.
• A proof that mining the proposed cryptocurrency is a dominant strategy
over other PoW/PoS blockchains and a Nash equilibrium over previous
cryptocurrencies 5.2.1, in addition to an Evolutionary Stable Strategy
5.2.2.
• The insight that the optimal efficiency of zk-PoI resides in that it’s imple-
menting the social optimum, unlike PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies that have
to pay the Price of (Crypto-)Anarchy 5.2.3.
• A proof that the circulation of the proposed zk-PoI cryptocurrency Pareto
dominates other PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies 5.2.4.
• A proof that the proposed cryptocurrency could become dominant over
previous ones due to stronger network effects and the lack of acceptance of
previous cryptocurrencies as a medium of payment 5.2.5.
• Finally, the lower costs of its infrastructure imply the existence of a unique
equilibrium where it dominates other forms of payment 5.2.6.
2 Related Literature
This section discusses how the present paper is significantly better and more
innovative than previous approaches in order to fulfill the objective of providing
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a Sybil-resistant and permissionless blockchain with anonymous transaction
processing nodes (i.e., miners). Moreover, it’s considerably cheaper than other
approaches[SABBD18, BKKJ+17] that would require the re-identification and
issuing of new identities to the global population because the current proposal
relies on the previously issued credentials of electronic national identity cards
(3.5 billion issued at the time of publication) and electronic passports (1 billion
issued at the time of publication).
Proof of Space[DFKP13, ABFG13] reduces the energy costs of Proof-of-Work
but it’s not economically efficient. Proof of Authority[Woo15](PoA) maintains
a public list of previously authorised nodes: the identities are not anonymised
and the blockchain is not open to everyone (i.e., the blockchain is permissioned).
Proof of Personhood[BKKJ+17](PoP) can be understood as an improvement over
Proof of Authority in that identities are anonymised, but the parties/gatherings
used to anonymise and incorporate identities into the blockchain don’t scale
to national/international populations and could compromise Sybil resistance
because it’s trivial to get multiple identities by using different disguises on
different parties/gatherings (i.e., they need to be validated simultaneously
and without disguises): however, the present paper produces Sybil-resistant,
anonymised identities on a global scale for a permissionless blockchain. More-
over, Proof of Personhood[BKKJ+17] is endogenizing all the costly process of
credential verification and issuing: by contrast, Zero-Knowledge Proof of Identity
is exogenizing/outsourcing this costly process to governments, thus making
the entire blockchain system cheaper. More recently, Private Proof-of-Stake
protocols[GOT18, KKKZ18](PPoS) achieve anonymity, but the economic ineffi-
ciencies of staking capital still remain and the identities have no relation to the
real world.
Pseudo-anonymous signatures[BHK+18] for identity documents provide an
interesting technical solution to the problem of anonymous authentication
using identity documents. However, the proposed schemes present a num-
ber of shortcomings that discourage their use in the present setting: some
schemes are closely tied to particular countries (i.e., the German Identity
Card[BDFK12, fIS16, KHK18]), thus non-general purpose enough to include
any country in the world, or flexible to adapt to future changes; they require
interaction with an issuer during card initialization; they feature protocols for
deanonymisation and revocation, not desired in the setting considered in this
paper; the initial German scheme[fIS16] could easily be subverted[KHK16] be-
cause the formalization of pseudo-anonymous signatures is still incipient[KHK],
and improvements are being worked out[BCLP14, Klu16, KHK18].
Anonymous credentials, first envisioned by David Chaum[Cha83], and first
fully realised by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya[CL01] with follow-up work im-
proving its security/performance[BCKL09, CHL05, CG10, CL04, BL12], are a
centrally important building block in e-cash. The use of anonymous credentials
to protect against Sybil attacks[Dou02] has already been proposed in previous
works[AKMP08, BCKL07] although with different cryptographic techniques and
for different goals. The main problem with anonymous credentials is that they
require a first identification step to an issuing party[Res18] and that would
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compromise anonymity. This problem is shared with other schemes for pseu-
doanymization: for example, Bitnym[FWB15] requires that a Trusted Third
Party must check the real identity of a user before allowing the creation of
a bounded number of valid genesis pseudonyms. Decentralized Anonymous
Credentials[GGM13] was first to show how to decentralise the issuance of anony-
mous credentials and integrate them within a blockchain (i.e., Bitcoin), but
they do not re-use previously existing credentials and they still rely on Proof-of-
Work for Sybil-resistance. Decentralized Blacklistable Anonymous Credentials
with Reputation[YAXY17] introduce blacklistable reputation on blockchains,
but users must also publish their real-world identity (i.e., non-anonymous).
QuisQuis[FMMO18] introduces the novel primitive of updatable public keys in
order to provide anonymous transactions in cryptocurrencies, but it doesn’t con-
sider their Sybil-resistance. DarkID[Arn18] is a practical implementation of an
anonymous decentralised identification system, but requires non-anonymous pre-
authentication and doesn’t consider Sybil-resistance. A previous work[AABM17]
on secure identity registration on distributed ledgers achieved anonymity from a
credential issuer, but the pre-authentication is non-anonymous, it doesn’t con-
sider Sybil-resistance and it doesn’t re-use real-world cryptographic credentials.
Recently, anonymous credentials on standard smart cards have been proved
practical[CDDH19], but in a different setting where the credential issuer and the
verifier are the same entity.
Previous works have also considered anonymous PKIs: for example, gen-
erating pseudonyms[RPKC07] using a Certificate Authority and a separate
Private Certificate Authority; however, this architecture is not coherent for a
permissionless blockchain because both certificate authorities would be open
to everyone and that would allow the easy linking of anonymous identities.
Another recent proposal for a decentralised PKI based on a blockchain[PSRK18]
does not provide anonymity, although it improves the work on cryptographic
accumulators on blockchains started by Certcoin[FVY14, RY15]; another pro-
posals introduce privacy-aware PKIs on blockchains[AG16, OP19], but they
are not Sybil-resistant and do not re-use certificates from other CAs. Previ-
ously, BitNym[FWB15] introduced Sybil-resistant pseudonyms to Bitcoin, but a
Trusted-Third Party must check the real identities of users before allowing the
creation of a bounded number of valid genesis pseudonyms. ChainAnchor[HSP16]
wasn’t Sybil-resistant and used Direct Anonymous Attestation just for anonymous
authentication, but not for mutual authentication: it worked on the permissioned
model, explicitly not permissionless, and the GroupOwner initially knew the
true identity of members; moreover, the Permissions Issuer is supposed not to
collude with the Verifier, although it has reading access to the identity database.
ClaimChain[KITD17] improves the decentralised distribution of public keys in a
privacy-preserving way with non-equivocation properties, but it doesn’t consider
their Sybil-resistance because it’s more focused on e-mail communications. Blind
Certificate Authorities[WAPaas18, WPasR16] can simultaneously validate an
identity and prove a certificate binding a public key to it, without ever learning
the identity, which sounds perfect for the required scenario except that it requires
3 parties and it’s impossible to achieve in the 2-party setting; moreover, it doesn’t
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consider Sybil-resistance.
Other approaches to anonymous identity include: Lightweight Anonymous
Subscription with Efficient Revocation[KLL+18], although it doesn’t consider
the real-world identity of users because it’s focused on the host and its Trusted
Platform Module; One Time Anonymous Certificates[AC10] extends the X.509
standard to support anonymity through group signatures and anonymous cre-
dentials, although it doesn’t consider Sybil-resistance and their group signatures
require that users hold two group secret keys, a requisite that is not allowed in
the current scenario because the user is not trusted to store them on the national
identity card (for the very same reasons, Linkable Ring Signatures[LWW04] and
Linkable Message Tagging[GP14] are not allowed as cryptographic tools whilst
group signatures and Deniable Anonymous Group Authentication[SPW+14]
would require a non-allowed setup phase). Opaak[MSCS12] provides anony-
mous identities with Sybil-resistance based on the scarcity of mobile phone
numbers: however, users must register by receiving an SMS message (i.e., the
Anonymous Identity Provider knows the real identity of participants). Oblivious
PRFs[JKR18] are not useful in the permissionless blockchains because the secret
key of the OPRF would be known by everyone, and the forward secrecy of
the scheme that would provide security even if the secret key is known would
not be of any use because the object identifiers ObjID would be easily pre-
dictable (i.e., derived from national identifiers). SPARTA[BBF+07] provides
pseudonyms through a distributed third-party-based infrastructure; however, it
requires non-anonymous pre-registration. UnlimitID[IHD16] provides anonymity
to OAuth/OpenID protocols, although users must create keypairs and keep
state between and within sessions, a requisite that is not allowed in the current
scenario. Another proposal for anonymous pseudonyms with one Trusted-Third
Party[YL] requires a division of roles between the TTP and the server that
is not coherent in a permissionless blockchain. With Self-Certified Sybil-free
Pseudonyms[MKAP08, AKMP08], the user must keep state (i.e., dispenser D)
generated by the issuer during enrollment and the Sybil-free identification is
based on unique featurs of the devices, not on the user identity. Another anony-
mous authentication using smart cards[TLW13] is only anonymous from an
eavesdropping adversary, not from the authentication server itself. TATA pro-
vides a novel way to achieve Sybil-resistant anonymous authentication: members
of an induction group must interact and keep a list of who has already been
given a pseudonym; therefore, a list of participants could be collected, but they
can’t be linked to their real-world identities; it’s not clear how to bootstrap the
initial set of trusted users to get them to blindly sign each other’s certificates.
Self-sovereign identity solutions usually rely on identities from social networks,
but their Sybil-resistance is very questionable because almost half of their
accounts could be fake[Nic19]: in spite of this, SybilQuorum[Dan18] proposes
the use of social network analysis techniques to improve their Sybil-resistance;
other research projects consider privacy-preserving cryptographic credentials
from federated online identities[MJW+14].
Regarding the game-theoretic aspects, most papers focus on attacking only
one cryptocurrency (e.g., selfish mining[ES13], miner’s dilemma[Eya14], fork
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after withholding[KKS+17]). For a recent survey of these topics, see[AH19].
Exceptionally, “Game of Coins”[SKT18] considers the competition between
multiple cryptocurrencies: a manipulative miner alters coin rewards in order to
move miners to other cryptocurrencies of his own interest (with a fixed cost and
a finite number of steps). However, in this paper, it’s the cryptocurrency issuer
who changes the rewards in order to attract miners from other cryptocurrencies
by producing the most efficient cryptocurrency to mine.
PoW PoSpace PoS PPoS PoA PoP zk-PoI
(Pseudo)-Anonymity X X × X × X X
Energy-Efficient × X X X X X X
Economically Efficient × × × × X × X
Permissionless X X X X × X(*) X
Table 1: Comparison of different Sybil-resistant mechanisms.
(*) Only if open to everyone, with no selective pre-invitation and no
right to exclude.
3 Building Blocks
3.1 Consensus based on the Cryptographic Random Se-
lection of Transaction Processing Nodes
The new family of consensus algorithms based on the cryptographically random
selection of transaction processing nodes[PS16, DPS16, KKJG+17, GHM+17,
HMW18] is characterised by:
Consensus algorithm Random selection method Sybil resistance
OmniLedger PVSS + collective BLS
signatures
[SJK+16, KKJG+17, BDN18]
PoW/PoS
RapidChain Performance improvements over
OmniLedger[ZMR18]
PoS
Algorand Cryptographic sortition by a
unique digital signature
PoS
Dfinity BLS threshold signature
scheme[BLS01]
PoS
Snow White Extract public keys based on the
amount of currency owned
PoS
• Transaction processing workers/nodes are randomly selected from a larger
group: in the case of Dfinity[HMW18], an unbiasable, unpredictable ver-
ifiable random function (VRF) based on the BLS threshold signature
scheme[BLS01] with the properties of uniqueness and non-interactivity;
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in the case of OmniLedger[KKJG+17], the original proposal used a col-
lective Schnorr threshold signature scheme[STV+15, SJK+16, KKJG+17],
although it has been updated to collective BLS signatures[BDN18]; in
the case of Algorand, secure cryptographic sortition is generated using an
elliptic curve-based verifiable random function (ECVRF-ED25519-SHA512-
Elligator2[GRPV19]); in the case of Snow White, cryptographic committee
reconfiguration is done by extracting public keys from the blockchain based
on the amount of currency owned. For a detailed comparison of random
beacon protocols, see [SJSW18].
• Regular time intervals (also named epochs or rounds) on which randomly
selected workers/nodes process the transactions.
• Faster transaction confirmation and finality.
• High scalability.
• Decoupling Sybil-resistance from the consensus mechanism (PoW/PoS is
about membership, not consensus).
• PoW/PoS to protect against Sybil attacks: however, the present pa-
per proposes the use of Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity (i.e., more
economically[Dia19] and environmentally efficient[KT18]).
3.2 X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
X.509 is an ITU-T standard[Uni18b] defining the format of public key certificates,
itself based on the ASN.1 standard[Uni18a]: these certificates underpin most
implementations of public key cryptography, including SSL/TLS and smartcards.
An X.509v3 certificate has the following structure:
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• Certificate
– Version Number
– Serial Number
– Signature Algorithm ID
– Issuer Name
– Validity Period:
∗ Not Before
∗ Not After
– Subject Name
– Subject Public Key Info
∗ Public Key Algorithm
∗ Subject Public Key
– Issuer Unique Identifier (optional)
– Subject Unique Identifier (optional)
– Extensions (optional):
∗ Key Usage (optional)
∗ Authority Information Access (optional)
∗ Certificate Policies (optional)
∗ Basic Constraints (optional)
∗ CRL Distribution Points (optional)
∗ Subject Alternative Name (optional)
∗ Extended Key Usage (optional)
∗ Subject Key Identifier (optional)
∗ Authority Key Identifier (optional)
• Certificate Signature Algorithm
• Certificate Signature
Certificates are signed creating a certificate chain: the root certificate of
an organization is a self-signed certificate that signs intermediate certificates
that themselves are used to sign end-entities certificates. To obtain a signed
certificate, the entity creates a key pair and signs a Certificate Signing Request
(CSR) with the private key: the CSR contains the applicant’s public key that is
used to verify the signature of the CSR and a unique Distinguished Name within
the organization. Then, one of the intermediate certificate authorities issues a
certificate binding a public key to the requested Distinguished Name and that
also contains information identifying the certificate authority that vouches for
this binding.
The certificate validation chain algorithm checks the validity of an end-entity
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certificate following the next steps:
1. The certificates are correct regarding the ASN.1 grammar of X.509 certifi-
cates.
2. The certificates are within their validity periods (i.e., non-expired).
3. If access to a Certificate Revocation List is granted, the algorithm checks
that none of the certificates is included (i.e., the certificate has not been
revoked).
4. The certificate chain is traversed checking that:
(a) The issuer matches the subject of the next certificate in the chain.
(b) The signature is valid with the public key of the next certificate in
the chain.
5. The last certificate is a valid self-signed certificated trusted by the end-
entity checker.
Additionally, the algorithm could also check complex application policies (i.e.,
the certificate can be used for web server authentication and/or web client
authentication).
3.3 Electronic Passports
Data Group Data Elements
Data Group 1
Document Types
Issuing State or Organizaton
Name (of Holder)
Document Number
Check Digit - Doc Number
Nationality
Date of Birth
Check Digit - DOB
Sex
Date of Expiry or Valid Until Date
Check Digit DOE/VUD
Optional Data
Check Digit - Optional Data Field
Composite Check Digit
Data Group 11 Personal Number
Data Group 15 User’s Public Key
Table 2: Data Groups from Electronic Passports
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Modern electronic passports feature NFC chips[ICA15b] that contain all
their printed information in digital form, using a proprietary format set by
International Civil Aviation Organization[ICA15a] and not X.509 certificates 3.2
like the ones used in national identity cards: the relevant fields are contained
within its Data Group 1 2 (i.e., the same information available within the Machine
Readable Zone), and the Document Security Object contains a hash of all the
Data Groups signed by a Document Signing Certificate issued every three months
(also stored on the passports), itself signed by a Country Signing Certificate
Authority (all the certificates are available online[ICA18]). Additionally, the
data within the NFC chips are cryptographically protected and it’s necessary to
derive the cryptographic keys by combining the passport number, date of birth
and expiry date (i.e., BAC authentication).
Finally, note that the electronic identity cards of some countries can also work
as ePassports (e.g., Spanish Identity Card -Documento Nacional de Identidad-).
3.4 Verifiable Computation
A public verifiable computation scheme allows a computationally limited client
to outsource to a worker the evaluation of a function F (u,w) on inputs u and
w: other alternative uses of these schemes allow a verifier V to efficiently check
computations performed by an untrusted prover P . More formally, the following
three algorithms are needed:
Definition 1. (Public Verifiable Computation). A public verifiable computation
scheme V C consists of three polynomial-time algorithms (Keygen, Compute, Verify)
defined as follows:
• (EKF , V KF ) ← Keygen
(
F, 1λ
)
: the key generation algorithm takes the
function F to be computed and security parameter λ; it outputs a public
evaluation key EKF and a public verification key V KF .
• (y, piy)← Compute (EKF , u, w): the prover runs the deterministic worker
algorithm taking the public evaluation key EKF , an input u supplied by
the verifier and an input w supplied by the prover. It outputs y ← F (u,w)
and a proof piy of y’s correctness (as well as of prover’s knowledge of w).
• {0, 1} ← Verify (V KF , u, w, y, piy): the deterministic verification algorithm
outputs 1 if F (u,w) = y, and 0 otherwise.
A public verification computation scheme V C must comply with the following
properties of correctness, security, and efficiency:
• Correctness: for any function F and any inputs u,w to F , if we run
(EKF , V KF )← Keygen
(
F, 1λ
)
and (y, piy)← Compute (EKF , u, w) then
we always get Verify (V KF , u, w, y, piy) = 1.
• Efficiency: Keygen is a one-time setup operation amortised over many
calculations and V erify is computationally cheaper than evaluating F .
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• Security: for any function F and any probabilistic polynomial-time adver-
sary A, we require that
Pr [(uˆ, wˆ, yˆ, piy)← A (EKF , V KF ) : F (uˆ, wˆ) 6= yˆ] ≤ negl (λ)
and
1 = Verify (V KF , uˆ, wˆ, yˆ, piy) ≤ negl (λ)
where negl (λ) denotes a negligible function of inputs λ.
Additionally, we require the public verification computation scheme V C to be
succinct and zero-knowledge:
• Succinctness: the generated proofs piy are of constant size, that is, irre-
spective of the size of the function F and inputs u and w.
• Zero-knowledge: the verifier learns nothing about the prover’s input w
beyond the output of the computation.
Practical implementations are Pinocchio[PGHR13] and Geppeto[CFH+14], or
Buffet[WSH+14] and Pequin[Pro16](a simplified version of Pepper[SMBW12]).
3.4.1 Verifiable Validation of X.509 Certificates as Anonymous Cre-
dentials
The algorithm for certificate chain validation chain in section 3.2 can be im-
plemented with the public verifiable computation scheme of section 3.4 using
zk-SNARKS to obtain a verifiable computation protocol so that a certificate
holder is able to prove that he holds a valid X.509 certificate chain with a
unique Distinguished Name, without actually sending the public key to the
verifier and selectively disclosing the contents of the certificate: in other words,
we re-use existing certificate chains and PKI infrastructure without requiring
any modifications, turning X.509 certificates into anonymous credentials. A
previous work already demonstrated the technical and practical viability of this
approach[DLFKP16]: the only handicap was that the proof generation could
take a long time (e.g., more than 10 minutes) and large keys (e.g., 1 Gbyte)..
Recent research advances have improved[BGG17] the initial setup of the
zk-SNARK protocol used to generate the Common-Reference String (CRS) with
an MPC protocol, such that it’s secure even if all participants are malicious
(except one). And faster proving times could be obtained by efficiently composing
the non-interactive proving of algebraic and arithmetic statements[AGM18] since
QAP-based zk-SNARKs are only efficient for arithmetic representations and not
algebraic statements, but at the cost of increasing the proof size.
In this paper, a practical implementation has been completed to check a
certificate chain with an additional validation policy and written as C code for
Pequin[Pro16], then compiled into a public evaluation and verification keys: unfor-
tunately, it isn’t scalable to millions of users and/or the large circuits/constraints
required to cover all the typologies of national identity cards/ePassports, thus
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an implementation based on TEE and mutual attestation is the preferred im-
plementation 4.2. The only zero-knowledge proof system that could be scalable
enough[WZC+18] works on a computer cluster, thus it doesn’t fit the setting of a
single user authenticating on his own device, and a libsnark backend can’t handle
more than 4 million gates requiring more than an hour of computation. Therefore,
an implementation only using software means is still Work-In-Progress.
3.5 Cryptographic Accumulators
Firstly devised by Benaloh and de Mare[BdM94], a cryptographic accumulator
[DHS15] is a compact binding set of elements supporting proofs of membership
and more space-efficient than storing all of the elements of the set; given an
accumulator, an element, and a membership witness, the element’s presence in
the accumulated set can be verified. Generally speaking, an accumulator consists
of four polynomial-time algorithms:
• Generate (1k): given the security parameter k, it instantiates the initial
value of the empty accumulator.
• Add (a, y)→ (a′, w): adds the element y to the current state of the accumu-
lator a producing the updated accumulator value a′ and the membership
witness w for y.
• WitnessAdd (w, y)→ w′: on the basis of the current state of a witness w
and the newly added value y, it returns an updated witness w′.
• V erify (a, y, w) → {true, false}: verifies the membership of y using its
witness w on the current state of accumulator a.
The following are interesting security properties of accumulators:
• Dynamic accumulators[CL02]: accumulators supporting the removal of
elements from the accumulator by means of a deletion algorithm Removal()
and a witness update algorithm WitnessRemoval ().
• Universality[LLX07]: accumulators supporting non-membership proofs,
NonWitnessAdd (), NonWitnessRemoval () and NonV erify ().
• Strong accumulators[CHKO12]: deterministic and publicly executable,
meaning that it does not rely on a trusted accumulator manager.
• Public checkable accumulators, the correctness of every operation can be
publicly verified.
Recent constructions of cryptographic accumulators specifically tailored for
blockchains are: a dynamic, universal, strong and publicly checkable accumulator
[FVY14]; an asynchronous accumulator[RY15] with low frequency update and
old-accumulator compatibility (i.e., up-to-date witnesses can be verified even
against an outdated accumulator); a constant-sized, fair, public-state, additive,
universal accumulator[PSRK18], and an accumulator optimised for batch and
aggregation operations[BBF18].
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3.6 Remote Attestation
In the terminology of Intel SGX, remote attestation is used to prove that an
enclave has been established without alterations of any kind: in other words,
remote parties can verify that an application is running inside an SGX enclave.
Concretely, remote attestation is used to verify three properties: the identity
of the application, that it has not been tampered with, and that it is running
securely within an SGX enclave. Remote attestation is carried out in several
stages: requesting a remote attestation from the challenger; performing a local
attestation of the enclave; converting said local attestation to a remote attestation;
returning the remote attestation to the challenger, and the challenger verifying
the remote attestation to the Intel Attestation Service.
A detailed technical description is outside of the scope of this paper: de-
tailed descriptions can be found in the standard technical documentation[CD16,
AGJS13, M18]. Recent attacks[VBMW+18] can be used to extract the secret
attestation keys used to verify the identity of an SGX enclave, and microcode
updates must be installed[Cor18] to prevent their exploitation: that is, it’s
essential to check that parties to a remote attestation are using a safe and
updated version. However, our protocols are inherently resistant to deniability
attacks[GPA18] because they are based on mutual attestation.
As it would be shown in the next section 4.2, remote attestation can be used
as a more efficient substitute of verifiable computation.
4 Authentication Protocols
In this section, we describe authentication protocols for Sybil-resistant, anony-
mous authentication using Zero-Knowledge protocols 4.1 and remote attestation
4.2.
4.1 Authentication Protocols using Zero-Knowledge
The use of zero-knowledge protocols guarantee the public-verifibility of the
correctness of the Sybil-resistant, anonymous identities committed to the per-
missionless blockchain.
4.1.1 Security Goals
The following security goals must be met for the system to be considered secure:
1. The registered miner’s key to the blockchain opens, but no one can shut; he
can shut, but no one can open (Isaiah 22:22, [Isa00]). For the security of the
system to be considered equivalent to the currently available permissionless
blockchains, anyone holding a valid public certificate should be able to
register a pseudo-anonymous identity on the blockchain but no one should
be able to remove it (i.e., uncensorable free entry is guaranteed).
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2. Protection against malicious issuers: some certification authorities may
turn against some citizens and try to cancel access to the permissionless
blockchain or stole their funds.
(a) Mandatory passphrase. An issuer may counterfeit a certificate with
the same unique identifiers, thus possessing a valid certificate isn’t
secure enough and a passphrase is deemed mandatory.
(b) Non-bruteforceable. Operations must be computationally costly on
the client side to prevent brute-forcing.
(c) No OCSP checking. Prevention against malicious blacklisting.
3. Privacy: miner’s real identity can’t be learned by anyone.
4. Unique pseudonyms: from each identity card/ePassport, only one unique
identifier can be generated.
5. Publicly verifiable: anyone should be able to verify the validity of the
miner’s public key and its pseudonym.
4.1.2 Zero-Knowledge Protocols (X.509)
Anonymous miner registration of a new public key on a permissionless
blockchain. This protocol generates a unique pseudonym for each miner, and
attaches a verifiable proof that its new public key to be stored on-chain is signed
with a valid public certificate included on a recognised certification authorities
list, and that the new public key is linked to the blockchain-specific pseudonym
that is in turn uniquely linked to the citizen’s public key certificate.
Miners holding a public key certificate must execute the following steps:
1. Create a deterministic public/secret key pair based on a secret passphrase
(no need for verifiable computation):
pk, sk = Det_KeyPairGen (KDF (passphrase, hash(publicCert)))
The generation algorithm must be determistic because the smartcard may
be unable to store them and/or the miner may loose them (i.e., as in
deterministic wallets). KDF is a password-based key derivation function
(e.g., PBKDF2).
2. Obtain a signature of the previously generated public key pk with the
miner’s public key certificate (no need for verifiable computation, this
operation could be executed on a smartcard):
signPK = PKCS_Sign (secretKeypublicCert, pk)
3. Check the validity of the certificate chain of the miner’s public key certificate
as extracted from the smartcard:
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(a) Load the public key of the root certificate.
(b) Hash and verify all intermediates, based on their certificate templates,
and the public key of their parent certificate starting from the root
certificate and following with the verified public key from the previous
intermediate certificate template.
(c) Hash and verify the miner’s public key certificate using the last verified
public key returned from the previous step.
(d) Check the time validity of the miner’s public key certificate.
(e) Check that the miner’s public key certificate is contained on a list of
trusted certification authorities.
4. Obtain the unique identifier from the miner’s public key:
uniqueID = getID(publicCert)
Note that the unique identifier is usually contained on Serial Number of
the certificate, or the Subject Alternative Name extension under different
OIDs, depending on the country.
5. Generate a deterministic pseudonym using the blockchain identifier:
signatureSecret = PKCS_Sign (secretKeypublicCert,
”PREFIXED_COMMON_STRING”)
pseudonym = Hash (signatureSecret||BlockchainIdentifier||uniqueID)
||”REG”
PKCS_Sign is the deterministic PKCS#1.5 signing algorithm executed on
a prefixed string to obtain a unique, non-predictable secret based on the
certificate’s owner. The obtained signature is appended to the blockchain
identifer and the unique identifier, and then hashed to derive a unique
pseudonym. Finally, the string “REG” is appended to differentiate this
pseudonym from the one generated during a remove protocol and prevent
replay attacks for removal reusing the generated zero-knowledge proof.
6. Verify the signature signPK on the miner’s public key certificate pk:
PKCS_Verify (publicCert, signPK)
7. As the signatureSecret is calculated offline by the smartcard, it’s also
necessary to verify it using the miner’s public key certificate publicCert:
PKCS_Verify (publicCert, signatureSecret)
8. Generate the zero-knowledge proof pi (e.g., zk-SNARK, zk-STARK or zk-
SNARG) of the miner’s public key certificate pk, the generated pseudonym
and, signature signPK such that all the previous conditions 3-7 hold.
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9. Anonymously contact the permissionless blockchain:
(a) optionally, check the miner’s real identity on a cryptographic accumu-
lator:
i. establish a shared secret running a Diffie-Hellman key exchange
between the prospective miner and the permissionless blockchain
ii. send attributes of the miner’s real identity encrypted with the
shared secret
iii. execute the non-membership proof NonWitnessAdd (w, y) on
the cryptographic accumulator
(b) register the generated pseudonym, the new public key pk, the signature
signPK and pi: note that they don’t reveal the miner’s real identity
(publicCert, uniqueID and signatureSecret are all keep as a secret).
The registering node of the permissionless blockchain verifies pi before adding
the new public key, the associated pseudonym, the signature signPK and the
succinct proof pi: note that the miner is unable to register multiple pseudonyms,
and he can only use one running node that would be signing messages with the
generated secret key sk. Other nodes would be able to efficiently verify pi to
confirm that the public key pk is a signed by someone from an allowed certificate
authority, and that the pseudonym is the miner’s unique alias for the blockchain.
Taking offline registrations from a permissionless blockchain. This
protocol takes offline a pseudonym and its associated public key pk and signature
signPK from a permissionless blockchain. Miners must execute the following
steps to take offline an identity from a permissionless blockchain:
1. Generate a zero-knowledge proof pi (e.g., zk-SNARK, zk-STARK or zk-
SNARG) of the steps 3-7 of the previous protocol to prove secret knowledge
of sk and that he’s able to re-generate the pseudonym, but this time
appending the string “OFF” to the pseudonym.
2. Anonymously contact the permissionless blockchain to take offline the gen-
erated pseudonym and all its associated data (including the cryptographic
accumulator), attaching pi.
The registering node of the permissionless blockchain verifies pi before taking
offline the pseudonym without learning the real identity of the miner (publicCert,
uniqueID and signatureSecret remain secret).
4.1.3 Zero-Knowledge Protocols (ePassports)
Analogous to the zero-knowledge protocols for X.509 4.1.2, but now considering
the specific details of ePassports 3.3, which usually contain a unique keypair
with the public key on Data Group 15 and the private key hidden within the
chip: the Active Authentication protocol can be used to sign random challenges
that can be verified with the corresponding public key.
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Anonymous miner registration of a new public key on a permis-
sionless blockchain. This protocol generates a unique pseudonym for each
miner, and attaches a verifiable proof that its new public key to be stored
on-chain is signed with a valid public certificate included on the list of Country
Signing Certificate Authorities, and that the new public key is linked to the
blockchain-specific pseudonym that is in turn uniquely linked to the public key
certificate of the passport holder.
Miners holding a public key certificate must execute the following steps:
1. Create a deterministic public/secret key pair based on a secret passphrase
(no need for verifiable computation):
pk, sk = Det_KeyPairGen (KDF (passphrase, hash(publicCert)))
The publicCert is taken from the Data Group 15. KDF is a password-based
key derivation function (e.g., PBKDF2).
2. Obtain a signature of the previously generated public key pk with the
miner’s public key certificate (no need for verifiable computation, this
operation is executed within the ePassport’s chip using the Active Authen-
tication protocol):
signPK = Sign (secretKeypublicCert, pk)
3. Check the validity of the Data Security Object of the miner’s ePassport:
(a) Load the public key of the Country Signing Certificate from a trusted
source [ICA18] and the Document Signing Certificate from the ePass-
port.
(b) Hash all the Data Groups and check their equivalence to the Data
Security Object.
(c) Verify the signature of the Data Security Object using the Document
Signing Certificate.
(d) Verify the signature of the Document Signing Certificate using the
Country Signing Certificate.
(e) Check the time validity of the certificates.
4. Obtain the unique identifier of the ePassport:
uniqueID = getID(DataGroups)
Note that the unique identifier is usually contained on the Data Element
“Document Number” of the Data Group 1: as it’s legally valid for the same
person to own multiple passports with different Document Numbers, some
countries include a unique “Personal Number” on the Data Group 11.
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5. Generate a deterministic pseudonym using the blockchain identifier:
signatureSecret = Sign (secretKeypublicCert,
”PREFIXED_COMMON_STRING”)
pseudonym = Hash (signatureSecret||BlockchainIdentifier||uniqueID)
||”REG”
Sign is the Active Authentication protocol executed within the ePassport’s
chip, a deterministic signing algorithm executed on a prefixed string to
obtain a unique, non-predictable secret based on the certificate’s owner.
The obtained signature is appended to the blockchain identifer and the
unique identifier, and then hashed to derive a unique pseudonym. Finally,
the string “REG” is appended to differentiate this pseudonym from the one
generated during a remove protocol and prevent replay attacks for removal
reusing the generated zero-knowledge proof (e.g., zk-SNARK, zk-STARK
or zk-SNARG).
6. Verify the signature signPK on the miner’s public key certificate pk:
PKCS_Verify (publicCert, signPK)
The publicCert is taken from the Data Group 15.
7. As the signatureSecret is calculated offline by the ePassport’s chip, it’s also
necessary to verify it using the miner’s public key certificate publicCert:
PKCS_Verify (publicCert, signatureSecret)
The publicCert is taken from the Data Group 15.
8. Generate the zero-knowledge proof pi (e.g., zk-SNARK, zk-STARK or zk-
SNARG) of the miner’s public key certificate pk, the generated pseudonym,
and signature signPK such that all the previous conditions 3-7 hold.
9. Anonymously contact the permissionless blockchain
(a) optionally, check the miner’s real identity on a cryptographic accumu-
lator:
i. establish a shared secret running a Diffie-Hellman key exchange
between the prospective miner and the permissionless blockchain
ii. send attributes of the miner’s real identity encrypted with the
shared secret
iii. execute the non-membership proof NonWitnessAdd (w, y) on
the cryptographic accumulator
(b) register the generated pseudonym, the new public key pk, the signature
signPK and pi: note that they don’t reveal the miner’s real identity
(publicCert, uniqueID and signatureSecret are all keep as a secret).
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The registering node of the permissionless blockchain verifies pi before adding
the new public key, the associated pseudonym, the signature signPK and the
succinct proof pi: note that the miner is unable to register multiple pseudonyms,
and he can only use one running node that would be signing messages with the
generated secret key sk. Other nodes would be able to efficiently verify pi to
confirm that the public key pk is a signed by someone from an allowed certificate
authority and that the pseudonym is the miner’s unique alias for the blockchain.
Taking offline registrations from a permissionless blockchain. This
protocol takes offline a pseudonym and its associated public key pk and signature
signPK from a permissionless blockchain. Miners must execute the following
steps to take offline an identity from a permissionless blockchain:
1. Generate a zero-knowledge proof pi (e.g., zk-SNARK, zk-STARK or zk-
SNARG) of the steps 3-7 of the previous protocol to prove secret knowledge
of sk and that he’s able to re-generate the pseudonym, but this time
appending the string “OFF” to the pseudonym.
2. Anonymously contact the permissionless blockchain to take offline the gen-
erated pseudonym and all its associated data (including the cryptographic
accumulator), attaching pi.
The registering node of the permissionless blockchain verifies pi before taking
offline the pseudonym without learning the real identity of the miner (publicCert,
uniqueID and signatureSecret remain secret).
4.1.4 Mapping to goals
The previous protocols achieve the security goals:
1. The registered miner’s key to the blockchain opens, but no one can shut;
he can shut, but no one can open. Only someone in possession of a valid
public certificate can create a unique miner identity on the open blockchain
and destroy it. Please note that the signing and verification of steps 2, 5,
6 and 7 are only needed if it’s required to check that the miner is the real
owner of the smartcard/ePassport.
2. Protection against malicious issuers: the passphrase is mandatory, there’s
no OCSP checking and the protocol is non-bruteforceable because it requires
the generation of a proof pi for every passphrase that is going to be tried
(>60 secs per pi).
3. Privacy: miner’s real identity can’t be learned by anyone because publicCert
and uniqueID are keep secret.
4. Unique pseudonyms: from each identity card/ePassport, only one unique
identifier can be generated because there’s only one uniqueID per citizen.
5. Publicly verifiable: using the proof pi, anyone is able to validate the miner’s
public key and its pseudonym.
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Additionally, cryptographic accumulators could be added to the protocols in order
to prevent multiple registrations whenever an expired certificate is renovated.
4.2 Detailed Authentication Protocols using Mutual At-
testation
The use of remote attestation protocols guarantee the efficiency and scalability
of the full authentication solution (i.e., it can easily scale to billions of users). By
design, the architecture has detached the encrypted DB from the mining nodes
to maintain the implementation as blockchain-agnostic as possible: some mining
nodes may include an encrypted DB, but it’s not necessary that all mining nodes
include it.
Figure 4.1: Simplified overview of mutual attestation.
4.2.1 Security Goals
The following security goals must be met for the system to be considered secure:
1. The registered miner’s key to the blockchain opens, but no one can shut; he
can shut, but no one can open (Isaiah 22:22, [Isa00]). For the security of the
system to be considered equivalent to the currently available permissionless
blockchains, anyone holding a valid public certificate should be able to
register a pseudo-anonymous identity on the blockchain but no one should
be able to remove it (i.e., uncensorable free entry is guaranteed).
2. Protection against malicious issuers: some certification authorities may
turn against some citizens and try to cancel access to the permissionless
blockchain or stole their funds.
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(a) Mandatory passphrase. An issuer may counterfeit a certificate with
the same unique identifiers, thus possessing a valid certificate isn’t
secure enough and a passphrase is deemed mandatory.
(b) Non-bruteforceable. Operations must be computationally costly on
the client side to prevent brute-forcing.
(c) No OCSP checking. Prevent against malicious blacklisting.
3. Privacy: miner’s real identity can’t be learned by anyone.
4. Unique pseudonyms: from each identity card/ePassport, only one unique
identifier can be generated.
4.2.2 Mutual Attestation for X.509 Certificates
Anonymous miner registration of a new public key on a permissionless
blockchain. This protocol generates a unique pseudonym for each miner, with
a new public key linked to the blockchain-specific pseudonym that is in turn
uniquely linked to the citizen’s public key certificate: the mutual attestation
between the parties guarantees the correctness of the execution of both parties.
The following are the steps to the protocol:
1. The client locally generates a signature secret using its secret key:
signatureSecret = PKCS_Sign (secretKeypublicCert,
”PREFIXED_COMMON_STRING”)
2. Mutual attestation between the authenticating client and the blockchain:
the attestation is anonymous thanks to the use of unlinkable signatures
(Enhanced Privacy ID -EPID-), and both parties obtain a temporary secret
key to encrypt their communications.
3. Client’s attested code checks the validity of the certificate chain of the
miner’s public key certificate as extracted from the smartcard:
(a) Load the public key of the root certificate.
(b) Hash and verify all intermediates, based on their certificate templates,
and the public key of their parent certificate starting from the root
certificate and following with the verified public key from the previous
intermediate certificate template.
(c) Hash and verify the miner’s public key certificate using the last verified
public key returned from the previous step.
(d) Check the time validity of the miner’s public key certificate.
(e) Check that the miner’s public key certificate is contained on a list of
trusted certification authorities.
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4. If the previous step concluded satisfactorily, then the client’s attested
code verifies the signatureSecret using the miner’s public key certificate
publicCert because the signatureSecret is calculated offline by the smart-
card:
PKCS_Verify (publicCert, signatureSecret)
5. If the previous step concluded satisfactorily, then the client’s attested code
creates a deterministic public/secret key pair based on a secret passphrase:
pk, sk = Det_KeyPairGen (KDF (passphrase, hash(publicCert)))
The generation algorithm must be deterministic because the smartcard
may be unable to store them and/or the miner may lose them (i.e., as in
deterministic wallets). KDF is a password-based key derivation function
(e.g., PBKDF2).
6. The client’s attested code generates a deterministic pseudonym using the
blockchain identifier:
pseudonym = Hash (signatureSecret||BlockchainIdentifier||uniqueID)
||”REG”
and it obtains the unique identifier from the miner’s public key:
uniqueID = getID(publicCert)
Note that the unique identifier is usually contained on Serial Number of
the certificate, or the Subject Alternative Name extension under different
OIDs, depending on the country.
7. Anonymously contact the attested encrypted database of the permissionless
blockchain to register the generated pseudonym and the new public key
pk: the uniqueID is also included using the temporary encrypted key, but
it won’t be revealed to the host computer of the blockchain node because
it will only be decrypted within the attested enclave.
8. The blockchain’s attested code checks within its encrypted database that
the uniqueID has never been included: then, it proceeds to store the
encrypted uniqueID (i.e., this time with a database secret key that only
resides within the enclaves), the generated pseudonym and the new public
key pk.
9. Then, the encrypted database’s attested code contacts the permissionless
blockchain to register the generated pseudonym and its new public key pk.
Taking offline registrations from a permissionless blockchain. This
protocol takes offline a pseudonym and its associated public key pk from a
permissionless blockchain. To take offline an identity from a permissionless
blockchain, miners must re-run the previous protocol to prove that the client
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is able to re-generate the pseudonym with the same certificate, but this time
appending the string “OFF” to the pseudonym.
The registering encrypted database of the permissionless blockchain verifies
that the encrypted uniqueID is included in the database before taking offline
the pseudonym from the permissionless blockchain without it learning the real
identity of the miner.
4.2.3 Mutual Attestation for ePassports
Analogous to the zero-knowledge protocols for X.509 4.2.2, but now considering
the specific details of ePassports 3.3, which usually contain a unique keypair
with the public key on Data Group 15 and the private key hidden within the
chip: the Active Authentication protocol can be used to sign random challenges
that can be verified with the corresponding public key.
Anonymous miner registration of a new public key on a permis-
sionless blockchain. This protocol generates a unique pseudonym for each
miner, with a new public key linked to the blockchain-specific pseudonym that
is in turn uniquely linked to the citizen’s ePassport: the mutual attestation
between the parties guarantees the correctness of the execution of both parties.
The following are the steps to the protocol:
1. The client locally generates a signature secret using its secret key:
signatureSecret = Sign (secretKeypublicCert,
”PREFIXED_COMMON_STRING”)
2. Mutual attestation between the authenticating client and the blockchain:
the attestation is anonymous thanks to the use of unlinkable signatures
(Enhanced Privacy ID -EPID-), and both parties obtain a temporary secret
key to encrypt their communications.
3. Client’s attested code checks the validity of the Data Security Object of
the miner’s ePassport:
(a) Load the public key of the Country Signing Certificate from a trusted
source[ICA18] and the Document Signing Certificate from the ePass-
port.
(b) Hash all the Data Groups and check their equivalence to the Data
Security Object.
(c) Verify the signature of the Data Security Object using the Document
Signing Certificate.
(d) Verify the signature of the Document Signing Certificate using the
Country Signing Certificate.
(e) Check the time validity of the certificates.
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4. If the previous step concluded satisfactorily, then the client’s attested
code verifies the signatureSecret using the miner’s public key certificate
publicCert because the signatureSecret is calculated offline by the ePass-
port’s chip:
PKCS_Verify (publicCert, signatureSecret)
The publicCert is taken from the Data Group 15.
5. If the previous step concluded satisfactorily, then the client’s attested code
creates a deterministic public/secret key pair based on a secret passphrase:
pk, sk = Det_KeyPairGen (KDF (passphrase, hash(publicCert)))
The generation algorithm must be deterministic because the ePassport
is unable to store them and/or the miner may lose them (i.e., as in
deterministic wallets). KDF is a password-based key derivation function
(e.g., PBKDF2).
6. The client’s attested code generates a deterministic pseudonym using the
blockchain identifier:
pseudonym = Hash (signatureSecret||BlockchainIdentifier||uniqueID)
||”REG”
and it obtains the unique identifier from the ePassport:
uniqueID = getID(DataGroups)
Note that the unique identifier is usually contained on the Data Element
“Document Number” of the Data Group 1: as it’s legally valid for the same
person to own multiple passports with different Document Numbers, some
countries include a unique “Personal Number” on the Data Group 11. Sign
is the Active Authentication protocol executed within the ePassport’s chip,
a deterministic signing algorithm executed on a prefixed string to obtain a
unique, non-predictable secret based on the certificate’s owner.
7. Anonymously contact the attested encrypted database of the permissionless
blockchain to register the generated pseudonym and the new public key
pk: the uniqueID is also included using the temporary encrypted key, but
it won’t be revealed to the host computer of the blockchain node because
it will only be decrypted within the attested enclave.
8. The blockchain’s attested code checks within its encrypted database that
the uniqueID has never been included: then, it proceeds to store the
encrypted uniqueID (i.e., this time with a database secret key that only
resides within the enclaves), the generated pseudonym and the new public
key pk.
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9. Then, the encrypted database’s attested code contacts the permissionless
blockchain to register the generated pseudonym and its new public key pk.
Taking offline registrations from a permissionless blockchain. This
protocol takes offline a pseudonym and its associated public key pk from a
permissionless blockchain. To take offline an identity from a permissionless
blockchain, miners must re-run the previous protocol to prove that the client
is able to re-generate the pseudonym with the same certificate, but this time
appending the string “OFF” to the pseudonym.
The registering encrypted database of the permissionless blockchain verifies
that the encrypted uniqueID is included in the database before taking offline
the pseudonym from the permissionless blockchain without it learning the real
identity of the miner.
4.2.4 Mapping to goals
The previous protocols achieve the security goals:
1. The registered miner’s key to the blockchain opens, but no one can shut;
he can shut, but no one can open[Isa00]. Only someone in possession of
a valid public certificate can create a unique miner identity on the open
blockchain and destroy it. The signing and verification operations of steps
1 and 4 are only needed if it’s required to check that the miner is the real
owner of the smartcard/ePassport.
2. Protection against malicious issuers: the passphrase is mandatory, there’s
no OCSP checking and the protocol is non-bruteforceable because it can
be rate-limited.
3. Privacy: miner’s real identity can’t be learned by anyone because publicCert
and uniqueID are keep secret.
4. Unique pseudonyms: from each identity card/ePassport, only one unique
identifier can be generated because there’s only one uniqueID per citizen.
The proposed solution depends on the security of Intel SGX (enclave and remote
attestation protocols): in order to limit the impact of side-channels attacks on
Intel SGX, mining nodes featuring the role of the Attested Encrypted DB will
be restricted to trustworthy nodes.
4.2.5 Performance Evaluation
# VMs Mean Time/Req. #Req./Sec Time/Connections Total time
1 VM 416 ms 4.76 210 ms 21 secs
4 VM 112 ms 16.5 59 ms 5.9 secs
A load testing scenario featuring an Intel Xeon E3-1240 3.5 GHz and running
1 or 4 virtual machines was performed (with 5 users executing 100 requests
per user). Operations like reading and/or signing from the smartcard were
not included in the performance evaluation. The implementation will be open-
sourced.
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4.3 Worldwide Coverage and Distribution
Figure 4.2: Legend: (1) National identity card is a mandatory smartcard; (2)
National identity card is a voluntary smartcard; (3) No national identity card,
but cryptographic identification is possible using an ePassport, driving license
and/or health card; (4) Non-digital identity card.
Fortunately, there is a unique cryptographic identifier for most people in the
world: figure 4.2 shows a worldmap of the distribution of national identity
cards. For some countries, there is no national identity card -code 3-, but some
other unique cryptographic identifier is available (e.g., ePassport[Nit09] and/or
biometric passports as in figure 4.3, social security card, driving license and/or
health card). Transforming these unique identifiers into anonymous credentials
enables the unique identification of individuals in a permissionless blockchain
without revealing their true identities, making them indistinguishable: that is,
authentication is not only anonymous but permissionless since there is no need
to be pre-invited. Please note the enormous cost savings resulting from this
approach compared to other anonymous credential[GGM13, SABBD18, CDD17]
proposals that would require re-issuing new credentials: for example, consider
that the UK’s national identity scheme was estimated at £5.4bn[Pro08].
In some cases, an individual could obtain multiple cryptographic identifiers
(e.g., multiple nationalities), but their number would still be limited and cer-
tainly less than the number of mining nodes that could be spawned on PoW
permissionless blockchains. Additionally, the true identities provided by national
identity cards could be used for other purposes, such as non-anonymous accounts
identified by their legal identities.
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Figure 4.3: Availability of biometric passports. Source (ICAO, 2019)
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4.3.1 eSIM’s Public Key Infrastructure
Latest specifications of SIM cards determine that SIM’s identity and data can
be downloaded and remotely provisioned to devices[GSM18]: instead of the
traditional SIM card, there is an embedded SIM (i.e., eUICC[All19]) that can
store multiple SIM profiles containing the operator and subscriber data that
would be stored on a traditional SIM card (e.g., IMSI, ICCID, ...).
A novel public key infrastructure has been created in order to protect the
distribution of these new eSIM profiles[Ass17]: every certified eSIM is signed by
its certified manufacturer, with a certificate that is itself signed by the GSMA
root certificate issuer[GSM19]. Network operators must also get certified and
obtain certificates for their Subscription Management roles.
The eSIM’s PKI provides an alternative identification system for users where
national identity cards and/or ePassports are difficult to obtain, as they must be
unique and non-anonymous (4.13 and 4.1.5[Ass17]), but only when the mobile
operator’s KYC processes can be considered trustworthy.
4.4 Circumventing the Impossibility of Full Decentraliza-
tion
Most blockchains using PKIs are consortium blockchains, thus it has become
widespread that they always are permissioned and centralised. However, the
term “permissionless” literally means “without requiring permission” (i.e., to
access, to join, ...), thus a blockchain with a PKI could be permissionless if it
accepts any self-signed certificate (i.e., a behaviour conceptually equivalent to
Bitcoin), or any certificate from any government in the world as described in the
previous subsection 4.3. In the same way, a blockchain using PKIs doesn’t imply
that its control has become centralised, it means that it accepts identities from
said PKIs as described in this paper: actually, decentralization in the blockchain
context strictly means that the network and the mining are distributed in a large
number of nodes, thus unrelated to authentication.
A recent publication[KLK+19] proves that it’s impossible for blockchains to
be fully decentralised without real identity management (e.g., PoW, PoS and
DPoS) because they cannot have a positive Sybil cost, defined as the additional
cost that a player should pay to run multiple time nodes compared to the total
cost of when those nodes are run by different players. To reflect the level of
decentralization, they introduce the following definition:
Definition 2. ((m, , δ)-Decentralization)[KLK+19]. For 1 ≤ m, 0 ≤  and
0 ≤ δ ≤ 100, a system is (m, , δ)-decentralized if it satisfies the following:
1. The size of the set of players running nodes in the consensus protocol, P ,
is not less than m (i.e., |P | ≥ m).
2. Define EPpi as the effective power of player pi as
∑
ni∈Npi αni where N
is the set of all nodes in the consensus protocol and αpi is the resource
power of player pi. The ratio between the effective power of the richest
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player, EPmax, and the δ − th percentile player, EPδ, is less than or equal
to 1 +  (i.e., (EPmax/EPdelta) ≤ 1 + ).
Ideally, the number m should be as high as possible (i.e., too many players do
not combine into one node); and for the most resourceful and the δ-th percentile
player running nodes, the gap between their effective power is small. Therefore,
full decentralization is represented by (m, 0, 0) for sufficiently large m.
Definition 3. (Sufficient Conditions for Fully Decentralized Systems)[KLK+19].
The four following conditions are sufficient to reach (m, , δ)-decentralization
with probability 1.
1. (Give Rewards (GR-m)). Nodes with any resource power earn rewards.
2. (Non-delegation (ND-m)). It is not more profitable for too many players
to delegate their resource power to fewer participants than to directly run
their own nodes.
3. (No Sybil nodes (NS-δ)). It is not more profitable for a participant with
above the δ-th percentile effective power to run multiple nodes than to run
one node.
4. (Even Distribution (ED-(, δ)). The ratio between the resource power of
the richest and the δ-th percentile nodes converges in probability to a value
less than 1+.
Theorem 4. For any initial state, a system satisfying GR-m, ND-m, NS-δ,
and ED-(, δ) converges in probability to (m, , δ)-decentralization. [KLK+19]
As it should be obvious by now, a blockchain using zk-PoI with strong identities
from trusted public certificates (e.g., national identity cards and/or ePassports
4.3) as described in this paper is the perfect candidate to achieve a fully decen-
tralized blockchain.
Theorem 5. A blockchain using zk-PoI with strong identities from trusted
public certificates (e.g., national identity cards and/or ePassports 4.3) reaches
(m, , δ)-decentralization with probability 1.
Sketch of Proof. A blockchain using zk-PoI with strong identities from trusted
public certificates effectively limits the number of mining nodes to one per
individual (ND-m), independently of how resourceful they are (NS-δ, ED-(, δ)),
while keeping membership open to everyone (i.e., achieves a large number of
participants (GR-m)). The presence of strong identities allows positive Sybil
costs, thus the fulfillment of the sufficient conditions for fully decentralized
systems[KLK+19].
Preventing delegation (ND-m) is the most difficult condition to meet:
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• market-enforced: richest participants could buy rights-of-use of others’
identities, but the market value of said identities (e.g., the Net Present
Value of future profits obtained from the exploitation of said identities
by their real owners) should wipe away almost all the profits from these
exchanges.
• strictly-enforced: miners’ software could frequently check for the presence
of the physical trusted public certificate (e.g., national identity cards
and/or ePassports) and/or require them when transferring funds out of
their accounts.
4.5 Resistance against Dark DAOs
Dark DAOs[DKMJ18] appear as a consequence of permissionless blockchains
where users can create their own multiple identities and there’s no attributability
of the actions.
1. When using real-world identities, it’s possible to establish the identity of the
parties running the Dark DAO that are committing frauds (attributability)
or at least, their pseudonyms: therefore, it’s possible to punish them.
2. To prevent Dark DAOs buying real-world identities, a smart contract can
be setup that pays a reward for denouncing the promoters of the fraud:
the whistleblowers would be paid a multiple of what they would get from
the defrauders, thus making denunciation the preferred option. Then
defrauders would be banned as in step 1.
4.6 Resistance against Collusion and other Attacks
In this sub-section, we consider different avenues for attack and provide detailed
defense mechanisms:
1. Corrupt root certificate authorities
2. Attacks against consensus protocols
3. Resistance against collusion
4. On achieving collusion-freeness
4.6.1 Corrupt Root Certificate Authorities
Corrupt countries may be tempted to create fake identities or frequently renovate
existing ones: these countries can be easily banned out by removing them from
the list of valid authorities (i.e., root X.509 certificate and/or Country Signing
Certificate). Bounties in cryptocurrency could be offered for whistleblowing any
corrupt attack against the long-term existence of the blockchain.
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4.6.2 Attacks against Consensus Protocols
Modern consensus protocols based on the cryptographically secure random choice
of the leader (e.g., [HMW18, KKJG+17]) detect cheating by monitoring changes
to the chain quality. The following table gathers cheating events for different
consensus algorithms that could be detected and punished:
Protocol Cheater detection
Dfinity[HMW18]
Equivocation: multiple blocks for same round
with same rank.
Equivocation: multiple blocks with the highest
priority.
All the blocks must be timely published.
All the notarizations must be timely published
within one round.
OmniLedger[KKJG+17]
Core validators can detect rogue validators.
Withholders can be detected after multiple
consecutive rounds.
5>= failed RandHound views from a rogue
validator.
4.6.3 Resistance against Collusion
Consensus protocols already provide collusion-tolerance by design: an adversary
controlling a high number of nodes, or equivalently all said nodes colluding for
the same attack, must confront the difficulties introduced by shard re-assignment
at the beginning of every new epoch. For the case of OmniLedger[KKJG+17],
the security of the validator assignment mechanism can be modeled as a random
sampling problem using the binomial distribution,
P
[
X ≤
⌊n
3
⌋]
=
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
mk (1−m)n−k
assuming that each shard has less than
⌊
n
3
⌋
malicious validators. Then, the
failure rate of an epoch is the union bound of the failures rates of individual
shards, each one calculated as the cumulative distribution over the shard size n,
with X being the random variable that represents the number of times we pick a
malicious node. An upper bound of the epoch failure event, XE , is calculated as:
P [XE ] ≤
l∑
k=0
1
4k
· n · P [XS ]
where l is the number of consecutive views the adversary controls, n is the
number of shards and P [XS ] is the failure rate of one individual shard. Finally,
for l→∞, we obtain
P [XE ] ≤ 4
3
· n · P [XS ]
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4.6.4 On Achieving Collusion-Freeness
Start noticing that collusion-freeness is not about preventing malicious behaviour,
only preventing that malicious players act as independently of each other as
possible. Following a previous seminal work[LMas05], collusion-freeness can only
be obtained under very stringent conditions: (a) the game must be finite; (b)
the game must be publicly observable; and (c) the use of private channels at the
beginning of the game is essential, but forbidden during the execution of the
protocol. Although blockchains are publicly observable, they are also an infinite
game where parties can freely communicate between them using private channels
at any time: therefore, collusion-freeness is impossible in the sense of [LMas05].
Fortunately, there is a way to get around this impossibility result: forbid
malicious/Byzantine behaviours requiring the use of mutual attestation for all
the nodes, thus precluding any deviation from the original protocol.
Conjecture 6. If mutual attestation is required for all the nodes, any infi-
nite, partial-information blockchain game with publicly observable actions has a
collusion-free protocol.
As mutual attestation is already required for zk-PoI 4.2, we would only be
extending its use for the rest of the blockchain protocol.
5 Incentive Compatible and Strictly Dominant
Cryptocurrencies
The success of cryptocurrencies is better explained by their incentive mechanisms
rather than their consensus algorithms: a cryptocurrency with poor incentives
(e.g., a cryptocurrency not awarding coins to miners) will not achieve any success;
conversely, better incentives and much more inefficient consensus algorithm could
still find some success.
Much research has been focused on conceiving better consensus algorithms for
decentralised systems and cryptocurrencies[PS16, DPS16, KKJG+17, GHM+17,
KJG+16, HMW18]: unfortunately, obtaining consensus mechanisms with better
incentives and economic properties is an area that is lacking much research, and
the combination of all the game-theoretic results contained in this section fills
this gap for the sake of achieving a focal point (i.e., Schelling point[Sch60]) in
the multi-equilibria market of cryptocurrencies. Thus, a selective advantage is
introduced by design over all the other cryptocurrencies, in explicit violation
of the neutral model of evolution[EAK+17] in order to obtain an incentive
compatible and strictly dominant cryptocurrency.
5.1 Incentive-Compatible Cryptocurrency
Shard-based consensus protocols have been recently introduced in order to
increase the scalability and transaction throughput of public permissionless
blockchains: however, the study of the strategic behaviour of rational miners
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within shard-based blockchains is very recent. Unlike Bitcoin, that grants all
rewards to the most recent miner, block rewards and transactions fees must be pro-
portionally shared between all the members of the sharding committee[KJG+16],
and this includes incentives to remain live during all the lifecycle of the consensus
protocol. Even so, existing sharding proposals[KKJG+17, ZMR18] remain silent
on how miners will be rewarded to enforce their good behaviour: as it’s evident,
if all miners are equally rewarded without detailed consideration of their efforts,
rational players will free-ride on the efforts of others.
One significant difference introduced in this paper with respect to other
shard-based consensus protocols is the use of Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity
as the Sybil-resistance mechanism: as we will see in the following sections,
it’s a significant novelty because solving Proof-of-Work puzzles is the most
computationally expensive activity of consensus protocols, thus it’s no longer
dominated by computational costs. This makes the necessity for an incentive-
compatible protocol even more acute: the preferred rational miner’s strategy is to
execute the Proof-of-Work of the initial phase of the protocol for each epoch and
to refrain from the transaction verification and consensus of subsequent phases
of the protocol, but still selfishly claim the rewards as if they had participated.
The substitution of costly PoW for cheap Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity
only increases the attractiveness of this rational strategy, that can only be
counteracted by using an incentive-compatible protocol.
5.1.1 A Nash Equilibrium for a Cryptocurrency on a Shard-Based
Blockchain
This section is based on a stylised version of a recent game-theoretic model[MJMF18],
taking into consideration that there is no cost associated with committee forma-
tion to enter each shard since we are using Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity,
and not costly Proof-of-Work: instead, a penalty p is imposed to defective and/or
cheating miners. The following is a list of symbols:
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Symbol Definition
k Number of shards
N Number of miners
xji Vector of received transactions by miner i in shard j
yj Vector of transactions submitted by shard j to blockchain
c Minimum number of miners in each committee
τ Required number of miners in shard for consensus
r Benefit for each transaction
bi Benefit of miner i after adding the block
cti Total cost of computation for miner i
co Total optional costs in each epoch
cv Cost of transaction verification
cf Fixed costs in optional cost
p Penalty cost
BR Block Reward
lj Number of cooperative miners in each shard
L Total number of cooperative miners in all shards
C
lj
j Set of all cooperative miners in shard j
D
n−lj
j Set of all defective miners in shard j
CL Set of all cooperative miners
DN−L Set of all defective miners
sr Signed receipt of a transaction
Let G denote the shard-based blockchain game, defined as a triplet (P, S, U)
where P = {Pi}Ni=1 is the set of players, S = {C,D} is the set of strategies
(Cooperate C, or Defect D) and U is the set of payoff values. Each miner receives
a reward if and only it has already cooperated with other miners within the
shard, the payoff of cooperative miners in set Clj is
ui (C) =
BR
klj
+
r
∣∣yj∣∣
lj
−
(
cf +
∣∣∣xji ∣∣∣ cv) (5.1)
We assume that the block reward BR is uniformly distributed among shards and
each cooperative miner can receive a share of it. A miner might be cooperative
but all other miners may agree on a vector of transactions yj that is different
from his own vector of transactions xji (i.e.,
∣∣∣xji ∣∣∣ 6= ∣∣yj∣∣): nonetheless, transaction
rewards are uniformly distributed among all cooperative miners in each shard,
proportional to all the transactions submitted to the blockchain by each shard.
The defective miners’ payoff can be calculated as
uDi = −pm
because the defective miners will have to pay a penalty and they will not receive
any benefit (and it doesn’t incur in any mandatory cost such as solving PoW
puzzles because we use cheap Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity).
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There exists a cooperative Nash equilibrium profile in game G under the
following conditions:
Theorem 7. Let Cljj and D
m−lj
j denote the sets of lj cooperating miners and n−
lj defecting miners inside each shard j with n miners, respectively.
(
CL, DN−L
)
represents a Nash equilibrium profile in each epoch of game G, if the following
conditions are satisfied:
1. In all shards j, lj ≥ τ .
2. If for a given miner Pi in shard j, with x
j
i = y
j, then the number of
transactions
∣∣∣xji ∣∣∣ must be greater than
θ1c =
cf − BRklj + p
r/lj − cv
3. If for a given miner Pi in shard j, with x
j
i 6= yj, then the number of
transactions
∣∣∣xji ∣∣∣must be smaller than
θ2c =
BR
klj
+
r|yj|
lj
− cf − p
cv
Proof. The first condition lj ≥ τ (i.e., the number of cooperative miners must
be greater than τ) must hold so that cooperative miners will receive benefits for
transactions and block rewards.
Let l∗j be the largest set of cooperative miners in each shard, where no miner
in Dn−ljj can join C
lj
j to increase its payoff: if miner P
j
i is among the set of
cooperative miners where xji = y
j , then it would not unilaterally deviate from
cooperation if:
BR
klj
+
r
∣∣∣xji ∣∣∣
lj
−
(
cf +
∣∣∣xji ∣∣∣ cv) ≥ −p
which shows that xji ≥ θ1c , whereas in the second condition,
θ1c =
cf − BRklj − p
r/lj − cv
But if P ji is among the cooperators whose vector of transactions is different from
the output of the shard, xji 6= yj , then it would not deviate from cooperation if:
BR
klj
+
r
∣∣yj∣∣
lj
−
(
cf +
∣∣∣xji ∣∣∣ cv) ≥ −p
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which shows that xji < θ
2
c , whereas in the third condition,
θ2c =
BR
klj
+
r|yj|
lj
− cf − p
cv
Then if l*j represents the largest set of cooperative miners in each shard, then(
CL, DN−L
)
would be the unique cooperative Nash equilibrium of the game
G.
As can be understood from the proof, cooperative miners have less incentive
to cooperate when: 1) the number of participants N increases; 2) the optional
costs of computation increase (cf is in the numerator or cv in denominator of θC);
3) or in general, when the number of transactions is not large enough compared
to a fixed threshold.
5.1.2 Incentive-Compatible Cryptocurrency on a Shard-Based Co-
ordinated Blockchain
In order to increase the incentives to cooperate rather than defect, an incentive-
compatible protocol enforcing cooperation based on the previously presented
Nash equilibrium is introduced here 1: all miners should disclose their list of
transactions to a coordinator, who then announces to each miner whether their
cooperation would be in their interests based on being within the maximum
subset of miners with a similar list of transactions (i.e., xji = y
j), and then
enforces their cooperation by checking their compliance and rewarding them
properly.
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function ShardTransactionsAssignment {
Shard← GetShard(epochRandomness, pseudonym,PK)
xi ← ShardTransactions(Shard)
}
function NodeSelection {
Pi send H
(
xji
)
to Coordinator
if (PresentNode() == Coordinator) {
Receive all H
(
xji
)
lj ←Max number of miners with common txs. from list of H
(
xji
)
if (lj < τ)
return “All Defective”
else {
C
lj
j = list of ljminers
Calculate θ1c and θ2c from theorem 7
return θ1c , θ2c and C
lj
j
}
}
}
function ShardParticipation {
if (Pi ∈ Cljj and
∣∣∣xji ∣∣∣ ≤ θ1c )
return Defect
else if (Pi /∈ Cljj and
∣∣∣xji ∣∣∣ ≥ θ2c )
return Defect
Verify transactions
yj=set of verified transactions by remaining cooperative Pi
Consensus on verified transactions
Sign BFT agreement result
return signature, agreed block’s header
}
function VerificationAndRewards {
Verify cooperation of Pi ∈ CL for each shard
Send rewards to cooperative Pi using equation (5.1)
}
Algorithm 1: Incentive-Compatible Protocol on a Coordinated Shard-Based
Blockchain
The protocol proceeds as follows: for the first function (i.e., ShardTransac-
tionsAssignment), each miner receives a list of transactions xji to verify based on
the epochRandomness and his pseudonymous identity and public key obtained
by the Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity.
For the second function (i.e., NodeSelection), all miners calculate a hash
H
(
xji
)
over their transaction list and send it to the coordinator. The coordinator
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finds the subset with the maximum number of miners with a common transaction
list, thus calculating θ1c , θ2c , lj and C
lj
j : in each epoch, the coordinator publicly
defines the list of cooperative miners Cljj and defective miners D
n−lj
j using on
theorem 7.
For the third function (i.e., ShardParticipation), all the transactions of each
miner are verified and a signed consensus is reached.
For the fourth function (i.e., VerificationAndRewards), the rewards are shared
between the cooperative miners and denied to those miners in Cljj that didn’t
cooperate.
5.1.3 Improved Incentive-Compatible Cryptocurrency on a Shard-
Based Blockchain
Although the role of a coordinator is essential to BFT protocols[KJG+16],
its expanded functionality in the previous incentive-compatible protocol 1 is
problematic: it introduces latency and network costs due to the new obligations
to report to the coordinator; moreover, it creates new opportunities for malicious
miners which may report false H
(
xji
)
or not follow coordinator’s instruction
to cooperate or defect. The next incentive-compatible protocol significantly
improves over the state of the art: the role of the coordinator is minimised,
strengthing the protocol by removing the previous vulnerabilities and making it
resistant to malicious miners.
Information propagation[DW18] is an essential part of any blockchain, and
gossiping transactions to neighbouring miners is one of its key features. In the new
incentive-protocol protocol, we require that any broadcasted/gossiped/propagated
transaction gets acknowledged with a signed receipt to its sender: then, senders
must attach these receipts to the consensus leaders and verification nodes in
order to ease detection of defective and/or cheating miners. Miners who were
gossiped transactions but didn’t participate are considered defective, and not
rewarded. In other words, the signed receipts serve as snitches that denounce
non-cooperative miners thus preventing that any reward gets assigned to them:
at the same time, all miners are incentivised to participate in the denunciation
in order to gain the rewards of non-cooperative miners and other free-riders.
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function ShardTransactionsAssignment {
Shard← GetShard(epochRandomness, pseudonym,PK)
xi ← ShardTransactions(Shard)
}
function GossipTransaction {
GossipTransaction()
sr= AcknowledgeTransmission()
Store sr
}
function ReceiveTransaction {
tx=ReceiveTransaction()
ReplyTransaction(sign(hash(tx)))
}
function ShardParticipation {
Verify transactions
Collect lists of sr for every Pi
yj=set of verified transactions by remaining cooperative Pi
Consensus on verified transactions
Sign BFT agreement result
return signature, agreed block’s header
}
function VerificationAndRewards {
Verify cooperation of Pi ∈ CL using lists of sr
Send rewards to cooperative Pi using equation (5.1)
}
Algorithm 2: Improved Incentive-Compatible Protocol on a Shard-Based
Blockchain
In order to save bandwidth, note that it’s not obligatory to send the full list
of all signed transaction receipts to consensus leaders and/or verification nodes:
only a random subset per each miner should be enough to catch defective miners.
Additionally, the absence of signed receipts could be used to detect the need
of a change of a consensus leader (i.e., “view-change”) in BFT protocols[KJG+16,
KKJG+17].
5.2 On Strictly Dominant Cryptocurrencies
A cryptocurrency using Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity as the Sybil-resistance
mechanism strictly dominates PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies: a miner having to
choose between mining different cryptocurrencies, one with no costs associated
with its Sybil-resistance mechanism and distributing equally the rewards, and the
others using costly PoW/PoS and thus featuring mining concentration, will always
choose the first one. That is, mining equally distributed cryptocurrencies using
Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity is a dominant strategy; in other words, the
strategy of mining Bitcoin and other similar cryptocurrencies is strictly dominated
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by the hereby described cryptocurrency. Ceteris paribus, this cryptocurrency
will have better network effects, thus better long-term valuation.
5.2.1 Strictly Dominant Cryptocurrencies and a Nash Equilibrium
The intuition behind the preference to mine fully decentralised cryptocurrencies
with the lowest expenditure (i.e., lowest CAPEX/OPEX implies higher prof-
itability), thus the search for better hash functions[CLC17, ACP+16, BDK15,
BCGS16], is formally proved here and then applied to the specific case of the
proposed cryptocurrency.
Definition 8. (Power-Law Fee-Concentrated (PLFC) cryptocurrency). A cryp-
tocurrency whose distribution of mining and/or transaction fees follows a power-
law (i.e., a few entities earn most of the fees/rewards), usually due to the high
costs of its Sybil-resistance mechanism.
Example 9. Proof-of-Work cryptocurrencies are Power-Law Fee-Concentrated:
90% of the mining power is concentrated in 16 miners in Bitcoin and 11 in
Ethereum[GBE+18].
Proof-of-Stake cryptocurrencies are Power-Law Fee-Concentrated: miners
earn fees proportional to the amount of money at stake, and wealth is Pareto-
concentrated[Par14].
Definition 10. (Uniformly-Distributed Capital-Efficient (UDCE) cryptocur-
rency). A cryptocurrency whose distribution of mining and/or transaction fees
is uniformly distributed among all the transaction processing nodes, and doesn’t
require significant investments from the participating miners.
Example 11. The proposed cryptocurrency using Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-
Identity is a Uniformly-Distributed Capital-Efficient cryptocurrency.
Definition 12. (Game of Rational Mining of Cryptocurrencies). A rational
miner ranks the cryptocurrencies according to their expected mining difficulty,
and chooses to mine those with lowest expected difficulty.
Example 13. Awesome Miner[Min18a], MinerGate[Min18b], MultiMiner[Mul18a],
MultiPoolMiner[Mul18b], Smart-Miner[SM19, CBGL19] and NiceHash Miner[Nic18]
are practical implementations of the Game of Rational Mining of Cryptocurren-
cies (although also considering their prices in addition to their difficulties).
Let ui be the payoff or utility function for each miner, expressing his payoff
in terms of the decisions or strategies si of all the miners,
ui (s1, s2, . . . , sn) = ui (si, s−i)
whese s−i are set of the strategies of the rest of miners,
s−i = (s1, s2, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn)
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Definition 14. A strategy s1 strictly dominates a strategy s2 for miner i if and
only if, for any s−i that miner i’s opponents might use,
ui (s1, s−i) > ui (s2, s−i)
That is, no matter what the other miners do, playing s1 is strictly better
than playing s2 for miner i. Conversely, we say that the strategy s2 is strictly
dominated by s1: a rational miner i would never play a strictly dominated
strategy.
Definition 15. A strategy s∗i is a strictly dominant strategy for miner i if and
only if, for any profile of opponent strategies s−i and any other strategy s
′
i that
miner i could choose,
ui (s
∗
i , s−i) > ui
(
s
′
i, s−i
)
We now demonstrate that mining UDCE crypto-cryptocurrencies 10 is a
strictly dominant strategy with regard to PLFC cryptocurrencies 8 in the Game
of Rational Mining of Cryptocurrencies 12 by showing that every miner’s expected
profitability is higher in UDCE cryptocurrencies.
Theorem 16. UDCE cryptocurrencies yield a strictly higher miner’s expected
profitability compared to PLFC cryptocurrencies in the Game of Rational Mining
of Cryptocurrencies.
Proof. Let N be the number of miners and R the average daily minted reward
per day: UDCE cryptocurrencies award an average of N/R units of cryptocur-
rency to every participant miner. For every miner on the long tail of the power
distribution, the amount earned with UDCE cryptocurrencies is obviously higher
than with PLFC cryptocurrencies. For the few miners that dominate PLFC
cryptocurrencies, their profitability is lower because they have to account for
the energy[KT18] and equipment costs in the case of PoW cryptocurrencies or
the opportunity cost of staking capital in volatile PoS cryptocurrencies[Dia19],
meanwhile in UDCE cryptocurrencies their cost of mining is so negligible com-
pared to PLFC cryptocurrencies that the balance of profitability is always tipped
in their favour.
Definition 17. The process to solve games called Iterated Deletion of Strictly
Dominated Strategies (IDSDS) is defined by the next steps:
1. For each player, eliminate all strictly dominated strategies.
2. If any strategy was deleted during Step 1, repeat Step 1. Otherwise, stop.
If the process eliminates all but one unique strategy profile s∗, we say it is
the outcome of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies or a dominant
strategy equilibrium.
Definition 18. A strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, s∗2, . . . , s∗n) is a Pure-Strategy Nash
Equilibrium (PSNE) if, for every player i and any other strategy s
′
i that player i
could choose,
ui
(
s∗i , s
∗
−i
) ≥ ui (s′i, s∗−i)
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Definition 19. A strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, s∗2, . . . , s∗n) is a Strict Nash Equilib-
rium (SNE) if, for every player i and any other strategy s
′
i that player i could
choose,
ui
(
s∗i , s
∗
−i
)
> ui
(
s
′
i, s
∗
−i
)
Additionally, if a game is solvable by Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated
Strategies, the outcome is a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 20. A UDCE cryptocurrency dominating PLFC cryptocurrencies is
a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Mining a UDCE cryptocurrency is a strictly dominant strategy with
regard to other miners mining PLFC cryptocurrencies because PLFC cryptocur-
rencies are strictly dominated by UCDE cryptocurrencies by Theorem 16, thus
a rational miner will always prefer to miner the latter.
Thus, by the application of Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies
(IDSDS) to the Game of Rational Mining of Cryptocurrencies 12, each miner
will eliminate mining PLFC cryptocurrencies in favor of mining an UDCE
cryptocurrency, leaving this as the unique outcome: therefore, mining a UDCE
cryptocurrency is a dominant strategy equilibrium by Definition 17 and a Nash
equilibrium by Definition 18 or by Definition 19.
Claim 21. (Uniqueness of Technical Solution). The proposed technical solution
using Zero-Knowledge Proof of Identity from trusted public certificates (i.e.,
national identity cards and/or ePassports) is the only practical and unique
solution for a UCDE cryptocurrency.
Proof. As demonstrated in the paper describing “The Sybil Attack”[Dou02],
Sybil attacks are always possible unless a trusted identification agency certifies
identities.
As National Identity Cards and ePassports are the only globally available
source of trusted cryptographic identity (3.5B for National Identity Cards and 1B
for ePassports), the only way to bootstrap a UCDE cryptocurrency is by using
the proposed Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity from trusted public certificates
(National Identity Cards and/or ePassports).
5.2.2 Strictly Dominant Cryptocurrencies and Evolutionary Stable
Strategies
Another interesting viewpoint to consider in the analysis of the cryptocurrency
market is the one offered by behavioural ecology and its Evolutionary Stable
Strategies 22: each cryptocurrency can be considered a unique individual in
a population, genetically programmed to play a pre-defined strategy. New
cryptocurrencies are introduced into the population as individuals with differ-
ent mutations that define their technical features (e.g., forking the code of a
cryptocurrency to change the hashing algorithm, or a zk-PoI cryptocurrency).
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An Evolutionary Stable Strategy 22 is a strategy that cannot be invaded by
any alternative strategy, that is, it can resist to the invasion of a mutant and
it’s impenetrable to them: once it’s introduced and becomes dominant in a
population, natural selection is sufficient to prevent invasions from new mutant
strategies.
Definition 22. The pure strategy s∗ is an Evolutionary Stable Strategy[Joh73]
if there exists 0 > 0 such that:
(1− ) (u (s∗, s∗)) + 
(
u
(
s∗, s
′))
> (1− )
(
u
(
s
′
, s∗
))
+ 
(
u
(
s
′
, s
′))
for all possible deviations s
′
and for all mutation sizes  < 0. There are two
conditions for a strategy s∗ to be an Evolutionary Stable Strategy: for all s∗ 6= s′
either
1. u (s∗, s∗) > u
(
s
′
, s∗
)
, that is, it’s a Strict Nash Equilibrium 19, or,
2. if u (s∗, s∗) = u
(
s
′
, s∗
)
then u
(
s∗, s
′
)
> u
(
s
′
, s
′
)
Theorem 23. Mining a UDCE cryptocurrency is an Evolutionary Stable Strat-
egy.
Proof. Since mining a UCDE cryptocurrency is a strictly-dominant strategy and
a Strict Nash Equilibrium 20, then it is an Evolutionary Stable Strategy because
it fulfills its first condition 22.
Additionally, mining a UCDE cryptocurrency based on the global network of
National Identity Cards and ePassports is an Evolutionary Stable Strategy over
national variants/mutants due to Claim 21.
Thus, the Game of Rational Mining of Cryptocurrencies 12 is a “survival of the
fittest” ecology, where the cheapest cryptocurrency to mine offering the higher
profits rises above the others.
5.2.3 Obviating the Price of Crypto-Anarchy
The most cost efficient Sybil-resistant mechanism is the one provided by a trusted
PKI infrastructure[Dou02] and a centralised social planner would prefer the use
of National Identity Cards and/or ePassports in order to minimise costs: instead,
permissionless blockchains are paying very high costs by using PoW/PoS as
Sybil-resistant mechanisms. In this paper, Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity is
introduced as a compromise solution between both approaches, thus obtaining a
very efficient Sybil-resistant mechanism with the best of both worlds.
In order to measure how the efficiency of a Sybil-resistant mechanism degrades
due to the selfish behaviour of its agents (i.e., a fixed amount of block reward
to be distributed among a growing and unbounded number of miners paying
high energy costs, as in Bitcoin), we compare the ratio between the worst Nash
equilibrium and the optimal centralised solution, a concept known as Price of
Anarchy in game theory because it bounds and quantifies the costs of the selfish
behavior of the agents.
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Definition 24. The Price of Anarchy [KP99]. Consider a game G = (N,S, u)
defined as a set of players N , strategy sets Si for each player and utilities
ui : S → R (where S = S1x . . . xSn are also called the set of outcomes). Define a
measure of efficiency of each outcome that we want to minimise, Cost : S → R,
and let Equil ⊆ S be the set of strategies in Nash equilibria. The Price of
Anarchy is given by the following ratio:
Price of Anarchy =
maxs∈Equil Cost (s)
mins∈S Cost (s)
The competition game between several blockchains and their cryptocurrencies
can be reformulated[ARMM+18] as a congestion game[Ros73, DM96] (hereby
included for completeness), more amenable to the formulations commonly used
for analyzing the Price of Anarchy (the necessity for the following definitions is
already intuited in the Discussion of [AH19]): as the number of miners increases,
it also exponentially decreases the chance that a given miner wins the block
reward by being the first to solve the mining puzzle (i.e., the system becomes
increasingly congested); it has been proved that free entry is solely responsible
for determining the resource usage[MGT18], and that the difficulty is not an
instrument that can regulate it.
Miners, mining servers and crypto-currencies Denote byN := {1, 2, . . . , N}
the finite set of miners that alter the utilities of other miners if any of them
change strategies and let K := {1, 2, . . . ,K} be the set of cryptocurrencies,
each associated to exactly one puzzle that miners are trying to solve. Let
M := {1, 2, . . . ,M}denote the set of Edge computing Service Providers (ESPs),
or mining servers used to offload the costly computational processing.
Strategies Let Si ⊂ KxM denote the set of ordered pairs (cryptocurrency,
ESP) corresponding to ESPs that miner i can rely on to solve the puzzles of a
given cryptocurrency. A strategy for miner i is denoted by si ∈ Si corresponding
to the cryptocurrency (puzzle) which a miner intends to solve using a given
infrastructure. A strategy vector s := (si)i∈N produces a load vector l :=
(lk,m)k,m, where lk,m denotes the number of users mining blockchain k at ESP
m.
Rewards, costs, and utilities Let ηk be the load of miners across all ESPs
towards cryptocurrency k. Then,
ηk :=
∑
m′∈M
lk,m′µk,m′
For a given load vector l, the time to solve the puzzle of the kth cryptocurrency
is exponentially distributed with expectation 1/ηk. Let qk be the probability that
puzzle k is solved by time T ,
qk = 1− exp (−Tηk)
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The probability that a given miner using ESP m is the first to solve puzzle k is
pk,m = 1lk,m>0qkµk,m/ηk
where 1c equals 1 if condition c holds and 0 otherwise. For simplification,
subscript m can be dropped and we consider a single ESP. Then, the probability
that a miner is the first to solve the puzzle is
pk (lk) = (1− exp (−Tµklk)) /lk
Let Uk,m (l) denote the utility to a miner who tries to find the solution of
the current puzzle associated to cryptocurrency k using ESP m and γk,m denote
the cost of mining blockchain k at ESP m:
Uk,m (l) =
{
pk,m − γk,m if pk,m > γk,m,
0 otherwise
and the utility of a tagged miner to mine a cryptocurrency k when there are lk
miners associated with the same cryptocurrency is
Uk (lk) = pk − γk, if pk − γk ≥ 0
Theorem 25. [ARMM+18]If for all i and j, Si = Sj and si does not depend on
i, then the Nash equilibrium is given by the solution of the following optimization
problem,
argminsΦ (s) :=
∑
k∈K
lk∑
l=1
pk (l)− γk
subject to:
∑
k∈K
lk ≤ N, lk ≥ 0
Definition 26. Let NashCongestedEquil ⊆ S be the set of strategies given
as solution of the optimization problem of Theorem 25, then the Price of
Crypto-Anarchy is given by the following ratio:
Price of Crypto-Anarchy=
maxs∈NashCongestedEquilCost (s)
Cost (zk-PoI)
In practice, the real-world costs of the Zero-Knowledge Proof of Identity
can be considered almost zero because it’s subsidised by governments and thus
exogenous to any blockchain system. Quite the opposite, the energy costs of
PoW cryptocurrencies are notoriously high[KT18]: it is estimated that mining
Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin and Monero consumed an average of 17, 7, 7 and 14
MJ to generate one US$, respectively.
The trivial extension to Proof-of-Stake is left as an exercise to the reader,
although it’s not as affordable as it may be seen: as of March 2019, an average
of 40% of the cryptocurrency supply is staked at a total of $4Bn between all PoS
blockchains[Dia19]. Actually, Proof-of-Stake is not strictly better than Proof-
of-Work as the distribution of the market shares between both technologies has
been shown to be indistinguishable (Appendix 3, [EAK+17]).
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5.2.4 Pareto Dominance on Currency Circulation
For completeness, a stylised version of a model of competing currencies[FVS16]
is introduced here to prove that UDCE cryptocurrencies also dominate PLFC
cryptocurrencies on their circulation (i.e., trading, speculating) due to their
stronger network effects, and not only mining as previously proved. The key
observation here is that by definition 8, the returns of mining PLFC cryp-
tocurrencies is concentrated on a very limited number of miners and the newly
minted cryptocurrency could be held for long periods of times: otherwise, if
they didn’t expect that the held cryptocurrencies would appreciate in time, they
would be mining another set of cryptocurrencies with better expectations. In
direct contrast, the distribution of mining and/or transaction fees of UDCE
cryptocurrencies is uniformly distributed by definition 10: therefore, the returns
of the holding strategy after minting them would be lower and their subsequent
circulation much less restricted.
Suppose an economy divided into periods, each period divided into two
subperiods: in the first subperiod, a perishable good demanded by everyone
is produced and consumed in a Centralised Market; in the second subperiod,
buyers who only consume are randomly matched with sellers who only produce
with probability σ ∈ (0, 1) in a Decentralised Market. Let β ∈ (0, 1) denote the
discount factor, φit ∈ R+ denote the value of a unit of currency i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
in terms of the CM food and φt =
(
φ1t , . . . , φ
N
t
) ∈ RN+ denote the vector of real
prices.
Definition 27. (Buyers). In a [0, 1]-continuum of buyers, xbt ∈ R denotes the
buyer’s net consumption of the CM good and qt ∈ R+denotes the consumption
of the DM good. The utility function of the buyer’s preferences is given by
U b
(
xbt , qt
)
= xbt + u (qt)
with u : R+ → R continuously differentiable, increasing and strictly concave
with u′ (0) =∞ and u (0) = 0.
Let W b
(
M bt−1, t
)
denote the value function for a buyer who starts period t
holding a portfolio M bt−1 ∈ RN+ of cryptocurrencies in the CM and let V b
(
M bt , t
)
denote the value function in the DM: the dynamic programming equation is
W b
(
M bt−1, t
)
= max
(xbt ,Mbt )∈R×RN+
[
xbt + V
b
(
M bt , t
)]
subject to the budget constraint
φt ·M bt + xbt = φt ·M bt−1.
The value for a buyer holding a portfolio M bt in the DM is
V b
(
M bt , t
)
= σ
[
u
(
q
(
M bt , t
))
+ βW b
(
M bt − d
(
M bt , t
)
, t+ 1
)]
+ (1− σ)βW b (M bt , t+ 1)
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and let q∗ ∈ R denote the quantity satisfying u′ (q∗) = w′ (q∗) so that q∗ gives
the surplus-maximizing quantity that determines the efficient level of production
in the DM. The solution to the bargaining problem is given by
q
(
M bt , t
)
=
{
m−1
(
β × φt+1 ·M bt
)
ifφt+1 ·M bt < β−1 [θw (q∗) + (1− θ)u (q∗)]
q∗ ifφt+1 ·M bt ≥ β−1 [θw (q∗) + (1− θ)u (q∗)]
and
φt+1 · d
(
M bt , t
)
=

φt+1 ·M bt ifφt+1 ·M bt < β−1 [θw (q∗)
+ (1− θ)u (q∗)]
β−1 [θw (q∗) + (1− θ)u (q∗)] ifφt+1 ·M bt ≥ β−1 [θw (q∗)
+ (1− θ)u (q∗)]
with the function m : R+ → R defined as
m (q) ≡ (1− θ)u (q)w
′ (q) + θw (q)u′ (q)
θu′ (q) + (1− θ)w′ (q) .
The optimal portfolio problem can be defined as
max
Mbt∈RN+
{−φt ·M bt + σ [u (q (M bt , t))− β × φt+1 · d (M bt , t)]+ β × φt+1 ·M bt }
thus the optimal choice satisfies
φit = βφ
i
t+1Lθ
(
φt+1 ·M bt
)
(5.2)
for every type i ∈ {1, . . . , N} together with the transversality condition
lim
t→∞β
t × φt ·M bt = 0 (5.3)
where Lθ : R+ → R+ is given by
Lθ (A) =
{
σ
u′(m−1(βA))
w′(m−1(βA)) + 1− σ ifA < β−1 [θw (q∗) + (1− θ)u (q∗)]
1 ifA ≥ β−1 [θw (q∗) + (1− θ)u (q∗)]
Definition 28. (Sellers). In a [0, 1]-continuum of sellers, xst ∈ R denotes the
seller’s net consumption of the CM good and nt ∈ R+denotes the seller’s effort
level to produce the DM good. The utility function of the seller’s preferences is
given by
Us (xst , nt) = x
s
t − w (nt)
with w : R+ → R+ continuously differentiable, increasing and weakly convex
with w (0) = 0.
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Let W s
(
Mst−1, t
)
denote the value function for a seller who enters period t
holding a portfolio Mst−1 ∈ RN+ of cryptocurrencies in the CM and let V s (Mst , t)
denote the value function in the DM: the dynamic programming equation is
W s
(
Mst−1
)
= max
(xst ,M
s
t )∈R×RN+
[xst + V
s (Mst , t)]
subject to the budget constraint
φt ·Mst + xst = φt ·Mst−1.
The value for a seller holding a portfolio Mst in the DM is
V s (Mst , t) = σ
[−w (q (M bt , t))+ βW s (Mst + d (M bt , t) , t+ 1)]
+ (1− σ)βW s (Mst , t+ 1)
Definition 29. (Miners). In a [0, 1]-continuum of miners of each type-i ∈
{1, . . . , N} token, xit ∈ R+ denotes the miner’s consumption of the CM good
and 4it ∈ R+denotes the production of the type-i token. The utility function of
the miner’s preferences is given by
Ue
(
xit,∆t
)
= xit − c
(
∆it
)
with the cost function c : R+ → R+ continuously differentiable, strictly increasing
and weakly convex with c (0) = 0.
Let M it ∈ R+ denote the per-capita supply of cryptocurrency i in period
t and ∆it ∈ R denote the miner i’s net circulation of newly minted tokens in
period t. To describe the miner’s problem to determine the money supply in the
economy, we start assuming that all miners solve the same decision problem,
thus the law of motion of type-i tokens at all date t ≥ 0 is given by
M it = ∆
i
t +M
i
t−1 (5.4)
where M i−1 ∈ R+ denotes the initial stock. The budget constraint is
xij = φ
i
t∆
i
t,
and given that the miner takes prices {φt}∞t=0 as given, the profit maximization
of the cryptocurrency emission problem is solved by
∆∗,it ∈ arg max
∆∈R+
[
φit∆− c (∆)
]
(5.5)
Definition 30. (Equilibrium). A perfect-foresight monetary equilibrium is an
array
{
Mt,M
b
t ,∆
∗
t , φt
}∞
t=0
satisfying 5.2, 5.3, 5.5 and 5.4 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
at all dates t ≥ 0 and satisfying the following market-clearing condition
Mt = M
b
t +M
s
t (5.6)
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Suppose that each miner j starts with M i > 0 units of currency i ∈
{1, . . . , N}: let δ denote the fraction 1 − δ of randomly selected miners in
each location j at each date t ≥ 0 who doesn’t offer their tokens to sellers
because they are holding them in expectation of their appreciation (i.e., PLFC
cryptocurrencies), so these tokens don’t circulate to other j positions whenever
sellers are relocated.
Conversely, an equilibrium with the property that miners don’t restrict the
circulation of recently mined tokens (i.e., UDCE cryptocurrencies) is as follows:
the optimal portfolio choice implies the first-order condition
u′ (q (Mt, t))
w′ (q (Mt, t))
=
1
βγit+1
for each currency i, where γt+1 ∈ R+ represents the common return across all
valued currencies between dates t and t+ 1. The demand for real balances in
each location is given by
z (γt+1; 1) ≡ 1
γt+1
L−11
(
1
βγt+1
)
because
βγt+1
N∑
i=1
bit < θw (q
∗) + (1− θ)u (q∗)
and with
Lδ (A) =
{
δ
u′(m−1(βA))
w′(m−1(βA)) + 1− δ ifA < β−1w (q∗)
1 ifA ≥ β−1w (q∗)
Because the market-clearing condition implies
N∑
i=1
φitM
i = z (γt+1; 1)
the equilibrium sequence {γt}∞t=0 satisfies the law of motion
z (γt+1; 1) = γtz (γt; 1)
because
M it = M
i
t−1 = ∆
i
for each i and provided that γt ≤ t, and the boundary condition
βγtz (γt; 1) ≤ w (q∗)
Suppose u (q) = (1− η)−1 q1−η, with 0 < η < 1, and w (q) = (1 + α)−1 q1+α
with α ≥ 0. The dynamic system describing the equilibrium evolution of γt is
γ
1+α
η+α−1
t+1 = γ
1+α
η+α
t (5.7)
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Theorem 31. The allocation associated with the circulation of UDCE cryp-
tocurrencies Pareto dominates the allocation with the associated the circulation
of PLFC cryptocurrencies, on a stationary equilibrium with the property that
the quantity traded in the Decentralised Market is given by qˆ (1) ∈ (qˆ (δ) , q∗)
satisfying
u′ (qˆ (1))
w′ (qˆ (1))
= β−1 (5.8)
Proof. The sequence γt = 1 for all t ≥ 0 satifies 5.7. Then, the solution to the
optimal portfolio problem implies that the DM output must satisfy 5.8. The
quantity qˆ satisfies
u′ (qˆ (1))
w′ (qˆ (1))
= δ
u′ (qˆ (δ))
w′ (qˆ (δ))
+ 1− δ
Because δ ∈ (0, 1), we have qˆ (1) > qˆ (δ), that is, the allocation associated with
the circulation of UCDE cryptocurrencies -qˆ (1)- Pareto dominates the allocation
associated with the circulation of PLFC cryptocurrencies -qˆ (δ)-.
5.2.5 On Network Effects
At the time of the release of this paper, cryptocurrencies have failed to provide
an alternative to traditional payment networks due to a combination of high
transaction fees, high finalization time and high volatility. The failure to find
the favor of merchants is also their biggest weakness: they aren’t part of two-
sided networks, and thus easily replaceable by any newer cryptocurrency better
able to create them. Actually, the first-mover advantage of the most valued
cryptocurrencies is lower than expected if any competing cryptocurrency leverages
network effects from other different sources (e.g., Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-
Identity from trusted PKI certificates).
A simple model is introduced here to analyze the evolution of competing
payment networks: consider the two-sided and incompatible payment networks
of two cryptocurrencies, BTC and zk-PoI, each with their corresponding groups
of merchants m and customers c; let mtBTC ,m
t
zkPOI denote the number of
merchants at time t and ctBTC , c
t
zkPOI the number of customers. A user joins
the payment networks at each time step t, with λ being the probability of being
a customer and 1− λ of being a merchant: each merchant prefers to join BTC
or zk-PoI depending on the number of customers in the same network, thus the
probabilities to join one of the networks are given by
cβBTC
cβBTC + c
β
zkPOI
,
cβzkPOI
cβBTC + c
β
zkPOI
and conversely, for customers the probabilities are given by
mαBTC
mαBTC +m
α
zkPOI
,
mαzkPOI
mαBTC +m
α
zkPOI
.
Note that some categories of users would prefer to use the expected number of
users and not their current tally: forward-looking merchants that need to invest
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on equipment to access the payment network are within this group, thus they
would prefer to use expected numbers,
E
(
cβBTC
)
E
(
cβBTC
)
+ E
(
cβzkPOI
) , E
(
cβzkPOI
)
E
(
cβBTC
)
+ E
(
cβzkPOI
) .
Each user can only join one payment network, modelling the fact that single-
homing is preferred to multi-homing in the real-world, and the particular network
is determined by the distribution of users on the other side at each time t. The
parameters α, β > 0 are elasticities of demand with regard to the numbers of
users on the other side of the payment network, effectively acting as measures of
indirect network effects: α can be empirically estimated by observing joining
customers over a small period of time and then calculating
α =
ln (mαBTC/(mαBTC+mαzkPOI))− ln (1− (mαBTC/(mαBTC+mαzkPOI)))
ln mBTC − ln mzkPOI
and converselyβ can be empirically estimated by observing joining merchants
and then calculating
β =
ln
(
cβBTC/(cβBTC+c
β
zkPOI)
)− ln (1− (cβBTC/(cβBTC+cβzkPOI)))
ln cBTC − ln czkPOI .
Theorem 32. (Dominance of the Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity cryptocur-
rency). A new cryptocurrency could achieve dominance over previous cryptocur-
rencies, overcoming first-mover advantages, if the expected number of accepting
customers would be much higher and the number of merchants using the previous
cryptocurrencies is low.
Proof. Note that the number of steps needed for a new cryptocurrency, mzkPOI ,
to overtake the previous one, mBTC , on the number of merchants, mzkPOI >
mBTC , is given by
(mBTC + 1) · (1− λ)−1
It’s possible for a new cryptocurrency to overtake a previous one on the number
of merchants whenever
E (czkPOI)− E (cBTC) > (mBTC + 1) · (1− λ)−1
and since mBTC is a low number and E (czkPOI) E (cBTC), it’s conceivable
that the previous condition could hold.
Now let’s consider the results of strong network effects on the final mar-
ket shares of both payment networks by examining the following differential
equations,
d (mBTC/mzkPOI)
dt
= (1− λ) (
cBTC/czkPOI)
β − (mBTC/mzkPOI)(
1 + (cBTC/czkPOI)
β
)
mzkPOI
52
and
d (cBTC/czkPOI)
dt
= λ
(mBTC/mzkPOI)
α − (cBTC/czkPOI)
(1 + (mBTC/mzkPOI)
α
) czkPOI
According to the signs of the previous derivatives, when α · β > 1 and
t→∞, the payment network with even a slight advantage over the other will
end acquiring all the merchants and customers, for example
lim
t→∞mzkPOI =∞, limt→∞czkPOI =∞
lim
t→αmBTC = 0, limt→αcBTC = 0
but with α · β < 1, the number of merchants and customers will equalize
mzkPOI = mBTC , czkPOI = cBTC
thus highlighting the importance of network effects.
5.2.6 Dominance over Cash and other Cryptocurrencies
The dominance of subsection 5.2.1 is based on mining and subsection 5.2.4
extends said dominance to the circulation of currencies: in this subsection,
the dominance will be based on the lower costs of a payment network of the
cryptocurrency using Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity; therefore, there exists a
unique equilibrium in which this payment system dominates.
A recent paper[Pid15] offers a model based on a version of Lagos-Wright[HL05]
to explain the substitution of cash by debit cards or any other non-deferred
electronic payment system incurring a fixed cost Ω (z) τ per each period τ , the
cost Ω (z) being financed by imposing fee ω on each payment where ω should
satisfy
Ω (z) = S [θω + (1− θ)ω]
and where S denotes the instantaneous measure of electronic payment transac-
tions, z is the state of development of the economy, θ ∈ [0, 1] is the share of cost
allocated to a buyer and (1− θ) is the share of cost allocated to a seller. In this
model, an electronic payment system can achieve dominance over cash using the
solution concept of iterative elimination of conditionally dominated strategies
whenever the state of development of the economy z is sufficiently high, and
there exists a unique equilibrium in the model such that agents choose electronic
payment transactions when z is strictly higher than the limiting cut-off function
Z∞ of the sequence of boundaries Z0,Z1, . . . of regions where an agent chooses
electronic payment transactions regardless of the choices of other agents. In
other words, it’s strictly dominant to choose electronic payments in an economy
having sufficiently advanced information technology so that Ω is negligible.
Corollary 33. Since the cost function Ω (z) of a UCDE cryptocurrency based
on Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity is much cheaper than of PoW/PoS cryp-
tocurrencies and other forms of electronic payment because its cards are already
distributed (i.e., de facto subsidised by governments), there exists a unique equilib-
rium in the model [Pid15] such that the agents choose the UCDE cryptocurrency
using zk-PoI and it dominates the other forms of payment.
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6 Conclusion
Although all permissionless blockchains critically depend on Proof-of-Work
or Proof-of-Stake to prevent Sybil attacks, their high resource consumption
corroborates their non-scalability and act as a limiting factor to the general
diffusion of blockchains. This paper proposed an alternative approach that
not only doesn’t waste resources, it could also help in the real-world identity
challenges faced by permissionless blockchains: the derivation of anonymous
credentials from widely trusted public PKI certificates.
Additionally, we study the better incentives offered by the proposed cryp-
tocurrency based on our anonymous authentication scheme: mining is proved
to be incentive-compatible and a strictly dominant strategy over previous cryp-
tocurrencies, thus a Nash equilibrium over previous cryptocurrencies and an
Evolutionary Stable Strategy; furthermore, zk-PoI is proved to be optimal be-
cause it implements the social optimum, unlike PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies that
are paying the Price of (Crypto-)Anarchy. The circulation of the proposed
cryptocurrency is proved to Pareto dominate other cryptocurrencies based on
its negligible mining costs and it could also become dominant thanks to stronger
network effects; finally, the lower costs of its infrastructure imply the existence
of a unique equilibrium where it dominates other forms of payment.
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